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PHYSICIANS’ ELUSIVE PUBLIC HEALTH DUTIES* 
RICHARD S. SAVER** 
Law, consistent with bioethics and medical norms, directs physicians to “put 
patients first.” To what extent do physicians have broader responsibilities for 
community health, beyond and even counter to those owed to their patients? 
More salient in the era of COVID-19, the question of physicians’ obligations to 
safeguard the health of non-patients continually vexes courts, policy makers, and 
scholars. 
This Article reveals how physicians’ public health duties are confoundingly 
elusive. Elusive in the sense that while at times affirming physicians’ special 
capacity and obligations to improve the health of the community, law more often 
obscures physicians’ public health duties with limited, ad hoc recognition and 
insufficient theorization. These public health duties are also elusive in actual 
application. Physicians can point to individual patient obligations as reasons to 
evade compliance with certain public health laws or to discount public health 
considerations in clinical decision-making. 
Putting patients first also masks less patient-centered justifications for physician 
disengagement with public health, including financial considerations and 
professional authority concerns. The strong patient-primacy directive has 
underappreciated costs. It frequently overrides physicians’ more elusive public 
health duties in ways that facilitate externalization of health risks to the general 
public. This Article analyzes the COVID-19 pandemic, antibiotic resistance, 
infectious disease reporting, the opioid crisis, and gun violence as disturbing 
examples. It further identifies important justifications, including, most 
importantly, role indispensability for amplifying physicians’ public health 
responsibilities. While difficult doctrinal and pragmatic challenges arise in 
recalibrating physicians’ duties, requiring community physicians to pay greater 
heed to the population’s health seems unavoidably necessary. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As the coronavirus 2019 (“COVID-19”) crisis worsened in March of 2020, 
some physicians continued to perform elective procedures like spinal 
decompression and “Tommy John” surgery, creating opportunities for virus 
transmission and potentially exacerbating shortages of oxygen, personal 
protective equipment, personnel, and other critical resources needed for 
fighting the pandemic. 1  These actions contradicted public health 
recommendations from influential authorities, including the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), the American College of Surgeons 
(“ACS”), and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”).2 It 
may seem counterintuitive that physicians would disregard public health to this 
degree. Yet, these physicians cannot simply be dismissed as outliers. A common 
justification was that the physicians had duties to their patients. Indeed, these 
physicians could credibly say that law, bioethics, and professional norms 
supported their conduct. 
Surely physicians have obligations to protect the health of the community? 
Improving public health seems socially desirable, right within doctors’ 
wheelhouse, and an implicit condition of their professional licensure.3 But the 
question of physicians’ responsibilities for the health of non-patients, more 
salient in the era of COVID-19, continually vexes courts, policy makers, and 
scholars. Actions to protect public health are in constant tension with 
 
 1. Mackenzie Bean, Laura Miller & Anuja Vaidya, These Hospitals and Physicians Aren’t Stopping 
Elective Surgery: Here’s Their Thinking, BECKER’S HOSP. REV., https://www.beckershospitalre 
view.com/patient-flow/these-hospitals-and-physicians-aren-t-stopping-elective-surgeries-here-s-their-
thinking.html [https://perma.cc/Z5MR-LZF9] (Mar. 19, 2020, 4:15 PM); Jordan McPherson, An MLB 
Pitcher Is Able To Get Tommy John Surgery in Florida During COVID-19 Outbreak. Why?, MIA. HERALD 
(Mar. 25, 2020, 11:21 AM), https://www.miamiherald.com/sports/mlb/article241482786.html 
[https://perma.cc/23AW-RLV9]. “Tommy John” surgery, or ulnar collateral ligament reconstruction, 
repairs a torn ligament that helps secure the elbow joint. Athletes who play throwing sports often have 
this surgery. Tommy John Surgery (Ulnar Collateral Ligament Reconstruction), JOHNS HOPKINS MED., 
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/treatment-tests-and-therapies/tommy-john-surgery-ulnar-
collateral-ligament-reconstruction [https://perma.cc/HAQ5-J938]. It is associated with baseball pitcher 
Tommy John, the first athlete to successfully return to baseball pitching after the procedure. Id. 
 2. Bean et al., supra note 1; CMS Releases Recommendations on Adult Elective Surgeries, Non-
Essential Medical, Surgical, and Dental Procedures During Covid-19 Response, CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-
releases/cms-releases-recommendations-adult-elective-surgeries-non-essential-medical-surgical-and-
dental [https://perma.cc/696H-8DFG]. The CDC initially recommended that health care providers 
reschedule elective procedures. See Interim Guidance for Healthcare Facilities: Preparing for Community 
Transmission of COVID-19 in the United States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 
29, 2020), https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/85502 [https://perma.cc/Z84S-PDHR]. For the recent 
CDC guidance about managing health care facility operations, see Healthcare Facilities: Managing 
Operations During the COVID-19 Pandemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/guidance-hcf.html [https://perma.cc/ 
4CGB-FMZQ] (last updated Mar. 17, 2021). 
 3. See infra Section I.C. 
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physicians’ duties to their individual patients. Law, bioethics, and medical 
norms typically consider physicians’ duties to individual patients supreme, 
reflected in the ubiquitous health care mantra of “putting patients first.” 4 
Meanwhile, physicians’ responsibilities for the health of the community, while 
technically acknowledged, frequently end up muddled or neglected. 
Conventional wisdom holds that law and policy should ensure that 
physicians attend to the individual patient’s needs, preferences, and values. This 
push for a more “patient-centered” health care system dominates much legal 
and medical scholarship as well as reports from expert advisory bodies.5 Putting 
patients front and center has considerable appeal for many reasons, including 
promoting patient trust, deterring physicians from conflicting interests, and 
shielding the intimate healing process between doctor and patient from outside 
interference. However, as some commentators have observed, this bias in favor 
of relationships with existing patients also frustrates serving the broader public 
interest.6 Addressing matters of collective importance, such as health care cost 
control, often requires standardized, regulatory approaches and looking beyond 
relational obligations to patients. 
This Article further cautions about always putting patients first and 
challenges the generally accepted dominance of patient-centered duties. It is 
the first to comprehensively analyze how patient primacy paradoxically crowds 
out needed attention to the critical public health space. It highlights the 
underappreciated costs of privileging the individual patient by considering the 
health vulnerabilities of the populace. Physicians can all too easily discount 
community health considerations because their public health duties under law 
are confoundingly elusive, both in theory and in application. Elusive in the 
sense that while law at times affirms physicians’ special capacity and obligations 
to improve the health of the community, it more often obscures physicians’ 
 
 4. See, e.g., Coombes v. Florio, 877 N.E.2d 567, 577 (Mass. 2007) (“To a physician, it is the 
patient . . . who must always come first.”); David Orentlicher, The Physician’s Duty To Treat During 
Pandemics, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1459, 1459 (2018) (“Physicians assume a primary ethical duty to 
place the welfare of their patients first, above their own interests.”); see also Thomas R. Viggiano, 
Wojciech Pawlina, Keith D. Lindor, Kerry D. Olsen & Denis A. Cortese, Putting the Needs of the Patient 
First: Mayo Clinic’s Core Value, Institutional Culture, and Professionalism Covenant, 82 ACAD. MED. 1089, 
1089 (2007) (articulating the “guiding principle of the practice: ‘the needs of the patient come first’” 
(citing William J. Mayo, The Necessity of Cooperation in Medicine, 75 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 553, 556 
(2000))). 
 5. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY 39–40 (Rona Briere ed., 2001); Ronald M. Epstein, Kevin Fiscella, Cara S. Lesser 
& Kurt C. Strange, Why the Nation Needs a Policy Push on Patient-Centered Health Care, 29 HEALTH 
AFFS. 1489, 1489 (2010); Maxwell J. Mehlman, Dishonest Medical Mistakes, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 
1144–53 (2006). 
 6. See, e.g., William M. Sage, Relational Duties, Regulatory Duties, and the Widening Gap Between 
Individual Health Law and Collective Health Policy, 96 GEO. L.J. 497, 500 (2008) (“[F]ar more legal 
issues in health care are approached as relational than as regulatory problems, making it very difficult 
for law to serve truly ‘public’ policy.”). 
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public health duties with limited, ad hoc recognition and insufficient 
theorization for the source and strength of such duties. These public health 
duties are also elusive in their actual operation. Because their public health 
responsibilities are viewed as inevitably inferior to their duties to individual 
patients, physicians have considerable discretion to evade public health laws or 
disregard public health implications of their treatment decisions. Thus, public 
health duties may theoretically exist, but it is debatable whether they 
pragmatically matter much when they hold such marginal sway over physician 
decision-making. 
A significant divide exists between medicine and public health. A 
physician provides specifically tailored treatment within the confines of a 
special doctor-patient relationship. In contrast, public health embraces a 
population perspective, seeking to understand the root causes of illness in the 
community and identify conditions for wellness and health promotion for the 
populace. 7  The practice of public health typically involves epidemiological 
analysis and disease control measures. 8  Public health also focuses more on 
prevention whereas medicine principally aims to cure existing illness. 9 
Moreover, public health services are usually associated with public health 
agencies, safety-net providers, and governmental health care programs—not 
regular clinicians.10 A perhaps necessary tension exists between medicine and 
public health as there are “inevitable tradeoffs that arise in trying to optimize 
health at both levels.”11 
The elusivity of physicians’ responsibilities to public health arises in part 
because law, reinforced by bioethics and medical norms, clings to the 
medicine/public health divide and envisions physicians’ duties as almost 
exclusively arising through formation of treatment relationships with individual 
patients. In favoring physicians’ connections to individual patients, U.S. law 
enforces an atomistic version of health care that matches American society’s 
traditionally strong embrace of individualism and liberty. Yet, as the COVID-
19 pandemic has shown, this also makes for a lousy public health response 
because of the “refusal . . . to think in terms of the social whole — of what’s best 
 
 7. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & LINDSAY WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, 
RESTRAINT 12 (3d ed. 2016). 
 8. What Is Public Health?, AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, https://apha.org/what-is-public-health 
[https://perma.cc/T2KQ-RRCN]. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 16–18 (2d 
ed. 2008). 
 11. Arnold J. Rosoff, Policy Challenges in Modern Health Care, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 523, 525 (2005); 
see also Bruce A. Barron, Conflicts Between Public Health and Medical Care, HUFFPOST, 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/health-care-costs_b_3037450 [https://perma.cc/M3DL-AF48] (June 
16, 2013). 
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for the community.” 12  Heightened emphasis on physicians as agents of 
individual health detracts from the common good by glossing over the 
interconnectedness of health care system stakeholders. As this Article explores, 
it is not so easy to cabin individualized medical considerations from public 
health. For example, a physician’s failure to counsel a patient with infectious 
disease about transmission risk may expose community members to the 
contagion. Physicians’ general disengagement with public health exacerbates 
the larger silo problem confronting the nation’s public health system—public 
health care remains underfunded, undervalued, and viewed as distinctly apart 
from an already fragmented health care delivery system.13 
Against this backdrop of elusivity and concerning threats to public health, 
this Article makes several important contributions. First, it addresses current 
confusion about the extent of physicians’ responsibilities for community health 
under current legal standards. It canvasses existing law to identify and critically 
evaluate the multiple sources of authority for physicians’ public health duties, 
their precise scope, their significance, and the discrete contexts in which they 
arise. Second, it analyzes how bioethics and medical norms reinforce the 
indeterminate yet ultimately inferior status of physicians’ public health duties 
under law. Third, it reveals how the strong patient-primacy directive frequently 
overrides physicians’ more elusive public health duties in ways that facilitate 
externalization of health risks to the general public. Moreover, it exposes how 
the broad patient-primacy directive can mask less patient-centered 
justifications, including financial considerations 14  and professional authority 
concerns,15 for physician disengagement with public health. Fourth, this Article 
argues that it is high time to bring not only greater clarity but greater weight to 
physicians’ public health obligations under law. It evaluates possible objections 
and also identifies important justifications, as a matter of legal theory, policy, 
and ultimately pragmatic need, that support such a recalibration of physicians’ 
duties. 
Some immediate qualifications are necessary. This Article considers the 
duties and obligations of “private” physicians treating patients in the course of 
ordinary care. It is these physicians in the clinical trenches for whom the public 
health-duties question is particularly elusive. In contrast, a smaller number of 
“public” physicians work in governmental agencies and wear official hats as 
health officers of the state. These public physicians, not the subject of this 
 
 12. Damon Linker, Coronavirus Is Revealing a Shattered Country, THE WEEK (July 1, 
2020),  https://theweek.com/articles/922812/coronavirus-revealing-shattered-country [https://perma 
.cc/W4LR-GXET]. 
 13. Eileen Salinsky & Elin A. Gursky, The Case for Transforming Governmental Public Health, 25 
HEALTH AFFS. 1017, 1017–19 (2006). 
 14. See infra Section III.A (discussing elective procedures during COVID-19). 
 15. See infra Section III.D (discussing opioid prescribing and prescription drug monitoring). 
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Article, can be more easily and readily understood to have obligations to work 
for community health, by virtue of their official positions and the enabling 
statutory and regulatory directives for their respective agencies.16 
Another qualification concerns the interaction of medical and public 
health duties. If the medicine/public health divide presents a false dichotomy, 
then individual health and public health need not always be in tension. 
Frequently, a physician who works to improve the health of her individual 
patients also helps to better community health. For example, a physician who 
zealously ensures that her patient promptly completes a treatment regimen for 
a sexually transmitted disease ends up protecting the patient but also public 
health by reducing the risk of transmission to sexual partners in the community. 
In many instances “putting patients first” aligns with public health. However, 
it is too deceptively simple to say that physicians who fulfill duties to individual 
patients also protect the health of the community. While the dual purposes need 
not always be in tension, divergence at times remains inevitable. It is these 
difficult, contestable situations of misalignment, and the impact of the 
elusiveness of private physicians’ public health duties, that form the focus of 
this Article. 
Part I describes the legal background, mapping out the limited instances 
where law imposes duties on community physicians to protect the public health, 
the common law and statutory sources of authority for these obligations, their 
imprecise scope, the contexts in which they arise, and how such duties remain 
secondary to physicians’ individual patient obligations. Part II analyzes how 
bioethics and medical norms amplify law’s patient-primacy directive and 
seemingly obscure and enfeeble physicians’ public health obligations. Part III 
reveals how the elusiveness of physicians’ public health duties presents insidious 
problems by enabling externalization of health risks from patients to the 
population at large. Part III then discusses examples across the wide public 
health space including the COVID-19 pandemic, antibiotic resistance, 
infectious disease reporting, opioid prescribing, and gun violence. Part IV 
acknowledges the difficult challenges, both doctrinal and pragmatic, in making 
community physicians’ public health duties more cognizable and influential. It 
also identifies various justifications for this shift. The most important reason is 
instrumental: physicians’ role indispensability. The private physician is 
strategically embedded between her patient, other patients, and society and 
performs critical sentinel, gatekeeper, and learned intermediary functions 
 
 16. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-45.5 (LEXIS through S.L. 2021-4 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. 
of the Gen. Assemb.) (providing duties of a public health authority director to include investigating 
causes of communicable disease and disseminating public health information); TEX. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 121.024 (Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of the 86th Leg.) (providing duties 
of a state health officer, or “health authority,” to include establishing quarantines and aiding the public 
health department in “disease prevention and suppression”). 
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essential to an effective public health system. These rationales may not fully 
address the legitimate concerns with recalibration of physicians’ public health 
duties. But, as this Article concludes, requiring private physicians to pay greater 
heed to the population’s health seems unavoidably necessary. 
I.  LIMITED LEGAL DUTIES TO PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH 
Physicians’ public health duties arise from a confusing patchwork of 
overlapping sources of authority, including common law governing the doctor-
patient relationship and statutory and regulatory requirements. At times, law 
acknowledges that private physicians play an important public health role and 
imposes community health responsibilities on clinicians in isolated, discrete 
contexts. Yet the obligations imposed are hardly robust and seemingly hold 
marginal sway over physician decision-making. More frequently, law has 
difficulty recognizing physicians’ duties beyond the relational obligations 
formed with specific patients. 
A. Fiduciary Duties, Non-Patients, and Dual-Loyalty Problems 
The usual starting place in understanding physicians’ duties is fiduciary 
law. Numerous courts recognize the doctor-patient relationship as fiduciary in 
nature because physicians, as trusted professionals with expert knowledge, may 
abuse their superior position over dependent patients. 17  Perhaps the most 
important duty in a fiduciary relationship, and most central to the question of 
medicine/public health conflict, is the duty of loyalty. This duty obligates the 
fiduciary to focus on the beneficiary’s interests and avoid conflicts where self-
interest and the interest of other parties detract from pursuit of the beneficiary’s 
goals.18 
However, the reach of fiduciary law to police the doctor-patient 
relationship is limited for several reasons. To start, there is considerable debate 
on how broadly fiduciary doctrine even extends to the doctor-patient 
relationship. Among other reasons, the doctor-patient relationship arguably 
lacks certain classic fiduciary features such as the fiduciary’s control over 
monetary assets. 19  In addition, fiduciary causes of action have often been 
 
 17. See, e.g., M.A. v. United States, 951 P.2d 851, 854 (Alaska 1998) (“[W]e have recognized that 
the unique nature of the physician-patient relationship confers upon physicians a fiduciary 
responsibility toward their patients.”); Witherell v. Weimer, 515 N.E.2d 68, 73 (Ill. 1987) (“A 
physician and his patient stand in a fiduciary relation . . . .”). 
 18. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 2 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2003) (“Despite the 
differences in the legal circumstances and responsibilities of various fiduciaries, one characteristic is 
common to all: a person in a fiduciary relationship to another is under a duty to act for the benefit of 
the other as to matters within the scope of the relationship.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Joan H. Krause, Skilling and the Pursuit of Healthcare Fraud, 66 U. MIA. L. REV. 363, 
389–90 (2012) (“[T]he physician, for example, lacks the fiduciary’s traditional control over the 
beneficiary-patient’s money.”). 
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confusingly intermingled with more traditional claims of medical negligence 
and informed consent. 20  Some leading treatises refer to the doctor-patient 
relationship as a “confidential,” rather than a fiduciary, relationship.21 Further, 
while numerous U.S. court rulings affirm that the doctor-patient relationship 
has fiduciary characteristics, courts in a small number of states have expressly 
disagreed.22 Other case law recognizes fiduciary duties for physicians in only 
very limited circumstances, such as obligations to maintain confidentiality, but 
has stopped short of applying fiduciary principles to all aspects of the doctor-
patient relationship including, importantly, financial conflicts of interest. 23 
Under some commentators’ views, physicians cannot be classic fiduciaries 
because this would unduly interfere with their competing responsibilities to 
society, including controlling health care costs. 24 Meanwhile, other scholars 
insist that physicians are traditional fiduciaries and criticize the nonfiduciary 
interpretation as based on misunderstanding of precedent and confusion about 
the types of personal interests fiduciaries may still pursue.25 
Nonetheless, to the extent that the treating physician is a fiduciary in some 
respects, certain loyalty obligations exist. As a fiduciary, the physician generally 
must act for the patient’s benefit, provide individually appropriate treatment, 
and avoid elevating other interests above the patient’s welfare unless there has 
been proper disclosure.26 Thus, the physician’s primary common-law duties are 
to act for the welfare of patients within individualized treatment relationships. 
Indeed, physicians’ traditional legal duties beyond the duty of loyalty, such 
as the duties of care, nonabandonment, and confidentiality, arise only from the 
formation of a treatment relationship with a specific patient. As the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts explains: “Unlike most duties, the physician’s duty to the patient 
is explicitly relational: physicians owe a duty of care to patients.”27 A more open-
ended duty to improve and safeguard the health of the larger community, and 
therefore individuals who are non-patients, rests on less firm footing within the 
common-law tradition. 
 
 20. See, e.g., Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking the Doctor’s Fiduciary Role 
in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 451, 464–66 (2000). 
 21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 2 cmt. (b)(1). 
 22. See Carlson v. SALA Architects, Inc., 732 N.W.2d 324, 331 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007); Gunter 
v. Huddle, 724 So. 2d 544, 546 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998). 
 23. See, e.g., MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS’ CONFLICTS 
OF INTEREST 210–11 (1993). 
 24. E. Haavi Morreim, Redefining Quality by Reassigning Responsibility, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 79, 92 
(1994). 
 25. Maxwell J. Mehlman, Why Physicians Are Fiduciaries for Their Patients, 12 IND. HEALTH L. 
REV. 1, 17–30 (2015). 
 26. Mary Crossley, Infected Judgment: Legal Responses to Physician Bias, 48 VILL. L. REV. 195, 251–
52 (2003). 
 27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 41 cmt. 
h (AM. L. INST. 2012). 
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Even if common law arguably acknowledges physicians as agents of more 
than just individual health because of their special skills and capabilities in 
population health promotion,28 physicians might be considered to have a dual-
loyalty problem—with simultaneous obligations to their individual patients and 
to the public. But this offers little leeway for physicians to pursue public health 
goals that are in tension with individual patient welfare. The dual-loyalty 
problem for physicians is hardly new. In a variety of contexts physicians may 
find that they owe concurrent obligations to a third party or to society as a 
whole and also to the patient, such as providing employment fitness exams, 
caring for team athletes, and providing medical assistance to the state in 
administering wartime interrogations.29 However, the message to physicians in 
most dual-loyalty scenarios has invariably been to restructure their roles to 
minimize dual-loyalty conflicts30 or resolve the dual-loyalty problem by putting 
patients first.31 
B. Common-Law Duties to Third Parties 
Common law has, at times, recognized a quasi-public health role for 
physicians in considering the welfare of third parties potentially endangered by 
the patient. Much of this case law concerns physicians treating patients with 
infectious disease and whether the physician needs to warn and/or protect third 
parties exposed to the patient’s contagion. While this case law occasionally uses 
expansive wording in describing physicians’ public health obligations, the actual 
contexts in which the duties arise remain quite limited. Moreover, 
demonstrating concern with burdening physicians with obligations outside their 
relationships with patients, courts have seemed reluctant to impose open-ended, 
affirmative duties to act for the welfare of the community. 
 
 28. See infra Section I.B. 
 29. See, e.g., Steve P. Calandrillo, Sports Medicine Conflicts: Team Physicians vs. Athlete-Patients, 50 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 185, 190–92 (2005); Rahul Rajkumar, A Human Rights Approach to Routine Provider-
Initiated HIV Testing, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 319, 364–65 (2007). 
 30. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Holly Fernandez Lynch & Christopher R. Deubert, A Proposal To 
Address NFL Club Doctors’ Conflicts of Interest and To Promote Player Trust, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Nov.–
Dec. 2016, at S2, S3 (arguing for severing the sports doctor’s dual loyalties to team and patient by 
creating two professional roles: a medical staff doctor with exclusive loyalty to the patient and a club 
evaluation doctor with exclusive loyalty to the team). 
 31. See, e.g., PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS., DUAL LOYALTIES: THE CHALLENGES OF 
PROVIDING PROFESSIONAL HEALTH CARE TO IMMIGRATION DETAINEES 5 (2011) (“While the 
term ‘dual loyalty’ may imply equivalence between a medical professional’s loyalty to the patient and 
loyalty to third party interests, no such equivalence exists. Ethically, with very rare and well-
circumscribed exceptions, a health professional is obligated to act in the interest of the patient above 
all other concerns.”); Solomon R. Benatar & Ross E.G. Upshur, Dual Loyalty of Physicians in the Military 
and in Civilian Life, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2161, 2161 (2008) (noting that one approach to resolving 
physician dual-loyalty problems is that the physician’s “professional responsibility to individuals is 
always considered to override responsibility to society”). 
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1.  Classic Infectious Disease Cases 
When a patient has a highly contagious disease, such as tuberculosis or 
scarlet fever, courts have traditionally recognized a duty on the physician to 
address health risks to the patient’s very close contacts, often family members.32 
Similarly, courts have acknowledged that sexual partners exposed to a patient’s 
sexually transmitted disease may bring a claim against the physician for alleged 
negligence in advising the patient about the risk of transmission.33 However, 
the case law is somewhat uneven as not all courts have recognized the 
physician’s duty to third parties even with highly contagious diseases.34 
Courts seem more likely to sustain claims by infected third parties when 
there is an underlying disease-reporting law imposing a statutory obligation on 
the physician to notify public health authorities about the illness. This indicates 
some legislative intent to protect third parties, providing greater justification 
for imposing a legal duty, enforceable under common law, on the physician to 
act. As an illustration, courts have recognized a potential cause of action by an 
infected neighbor, based in part on a state disease-reporting statute, for the 
physician’s alleged failure to diagnose a patient’s smallpox, thus putting the 
patient’s neighbors at risk.35 
2.  Noninfectious Diseases and Physicians’ Special Role in Public Health 
Physicians’ limited legal obligations to non-patients have also been 
recognized at times in situations of noninfectious disease. In one case, a court 
found a spouse had an actionable claim against a physician for failure to warn 
her of her husband’s contraction of Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever.36 Although 
the underlying illness was not considered contagious, the court looked at the 
clustering effects and commonly shared sources of exposure, and ultimately 
found that the husband’s disease status indicated her increased risk for 
contracting the disease. 37  Similarly, courts have analogized to infectious 
disease-reporting obligations in finding a physician has a duty to protect the 
 
 32. See, e.g., Skillings v. Allen, 173 N.W. 663, 663 (Minn. 1919) (scarlet fever); Hofmann v. 
Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752, 753 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (tuberculosis); see also 43 AM. JUR. 2D Proof 
of Facts § 3 (2020) (“[A] physician who treats a patient for a communicable disease may be under a duty 
to diagnose the disease’s contagious and infectious nature . . . .”). 
 33. Cf. DiMarco v. Lynch Homes—Chester Cnty., Inc., 583 A.2d 422, 424 (Pa. 1990) (“[I]t is 
imperative that the physician give his or her patient the proper advice about preventing the spread of 
the disease.”). 
 34. See, e.g., Britton v. Soltes, 563 N.E.2d 910, 912–13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
 35. Jones v. Stanko, 160 N.E. 456, 457 (Ohio 1928). See generally Tracey A. Bateman, Annotation, 
Liability of Doctor or Other Health Practitioner to Third Party Contracting Contagious Disease from Doctor’s 
Patient, 3 A.L.R. 5th 370 § 2b (1992) (describing facts and circumstances tending to establish a 
physician’s liability to a third party due to the physician’s failure to exercise the requisite degree of care 
to protect against exposure to a patient with a contagious disease). 
 36. Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 872–73 (Tenn. 1993). 
 37. Id. at 872. 
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driving public when prescribing medication that increases the risk of injury to 
third parties from the impaired patient’s driving.38 
In these cases addressing physicians’ potential obligations to third parties, 
courts have at times used seemingly broad language recognizing and affirming 
a critical public health role for private physicians. The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania has observed that physicians can powerfully safeguard health 
beyond the patient as “[p]hysicians are the first line of defense against the 
spread of communicable diseases, because physicians know what measures must 
be taken to prevent the infection of others.”39 More recently, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court stated “that such [sanctity of the doctor-patient relationship] 
concerns are at their nadir, and a physician’s broader public health obligations 
are at their zenith, with respect to the diagnosis and treatment of infectious 
diseases.”40 Indeed, some commentators interpret this case law as recognizing 
“a physician has a duty to protect public health.”41 
3.  Ultimate Constraints on Public Health Duties 
However, a more generalized duty to protect public health lacks a clear 
foundation in common law. First, the infectious disease line of cases typically 
extends the physician’s duty to a spouse, sexual partner, or other third party 
intimate with or in very close nexus to the patient. In other words, the 
physician’s duty extends to a specific third party, rather than the public at large. 
For example, in Tenuto v. Lederle Laboratories,42 the New York State Court of 
Appeals held that a physician prescribing an infant an oral polio vaccine had a 
duty to warn the infant’s parents of the risk of transmission of the virus to the 
parents.43 The court emphasized the physician’s duty extended to the parents 
because of their close relationship to the patient, reasoning that 
an attending physician is, in a certain sense, in custody of a patient 
afflicted with infectious or contagious disease. And he owes a duty to 
those who are ignorant of such disease, and who by reason of family ties, or 
otherwise, are liable to be brought in contact with the patient, to instruct 
and advise . . . them as to the character of the disease.44 
 
 38. See, e.g., Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364, 370–71 (Tex. App. 1983). 
 39. DiMarco v. Lynch Homes—Chester Cnty., Inc., 583 A.2d 422, 424 (Pa. 1990). 
 40. Doe v. Cochran, 210 A.3d 469, 488 (Conn. 2019) (finding physician who incorrectly told 
patient he tested negative for herpes had actionable duty to patient’s girlfriend who later contracted 
the disease). 
 41. Caitlin A. Schmid, Protecting the Physician in HIV Misdiagnosis Cases, 46 DUKE L.J. 431, 447 
(1996) (emphasis added). 
 42. 687 N.E.2d 1300 (N.Y. 1997). 
 43. Id. at 1303. 
 44. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Davis v. Rodman, 226 S.W. 612, 614 (Ark. 
1921)). 
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This is very different than recognizing a duty to the community at large, where 
many individuals may have only more indirect connections to the physician’s 
patient. 
Second, to the extent there is a legal duty on the physician to act for 
identifiable third parties in close nexus to the patient, the common-law duty 
described is usually narrowly limited to advising or warning the patient about 
her risk to others, as opposed to requiring broader steps. 45 If there were a 
generalized, robust duty to protect public health, then one might expect the 
duty to be articulated as needing to control the patient to protect the public at 
large, which courts have sometimes expressly avoided.46 
Judicial sensitivity to limiting legal duties to defined, fixed orbits, and not 
overburdening physicians with infeasible liability pressures to “a prohibitive 
number of possible plaintiffs,”47 has led some later courts to try to clarify and 
narrow the scope of earlier infectious disease case law. These later cases try to 
make clear that the physician’s duty is usually limited to accurately advising the 
patient about the communicable disease and the risk it presents to others.48 A 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania case, Seebold v. Prison Health Services, Inc.,49 
reflects this patient-centered duty.50 In Seebold, a corrections officer claimed he 
was infected with methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus (“MRSA”) after 
prison physicians’ allegedly failed to control a MRSA outbreak among patient-
inmates.51 The court concluded the physicians’ legal obligation did not extend 
to reaching out to third parties, even by warning, and was reluctant “to extend 
the requirement for affirmative physician interventions outside the physician-
patient relationship.”52 Indeed, some courts have exhibited clear discomfort in 
imposing a broad duty to third parties if this would cause the physician to 
disfavor the interests of the patient. For example, in Webb v. Jarvis,53 involving 
a third party injured by a patient, allegedly as a result of the patient’s aggressive 
 
 45. See Doe, 210 A.3d at 491 (holding that although defendant physician had a duty to third-party 
plaintiff, the physician “was under no obligation to contact the plaintiff, to otherwise ensure that she 
was made aware of [the patient’s] test results, or to do anything other than fulfill his undisputed 
professional obligation to accurately convey his patient’s test results to the patient himself”). 
 46. See, e.g., Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364, 370 (Tex. App. 1983) (“[The physician] may have 
had a duty to warn his patient not to drive. We do not hold he had a duty to prevent her from 
driving . . . .” (first emphasis added)). 
 47. McNulty v. City of New York, 792 N.E.2d 162, 166 (N.Y. 2003) (finding doctor treating 
patient with meningitis owed no duty of care to patient’s friend who eventually contracted the disease). 
 48. See Walters v. UPMC Presbyterian Shadyside, 31 Pa. D. & C.5th 281, 292–95 (2013) 
(summarizing previous cases). 
 49. 57 A.3d 1232 (Pa. 2012). 
 50. Cf. id. at 1243 (refraining from “redefin[ing] the nature of the duty at issue to require 
physicians to undertake interventions outside the confidential physician-patient relationship”). 
 51. Id. at 1234. 
 52. Id. at 1248 (emphasis added). 
 53. 575 N.E.2d 992 (Ind. 1991). 
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reaction to medication treatment, the Indiana Supreme Court declined to 
impose a duty and reasoned, 
A physician’s first loyalty must be to his patient. Imposing a duty on a 
physician to predict a patient’s behavioral reaction to medication and to 
identify possible plaintiffs would cause a divided loyalty. Were we to 
impose a duty on a physician to consider the risk of harm to third persons 
before prescribing medication to a patient, we would be forcing the 
physician to weigh the welfare of unknown persons against the welfare 
of his patient. Such an imposition is unacceptable. The physician has the 
duty to his patient to decide when and what medication to prescribe to 
the patient, and to inform the patient regarding the risks and benefits of 
a particular drug therapy.54 
Third, the case law recognizing a physician’s duty to third parties in 
infectious disease cases is decidedly mixed and uneven.55 Some courts have 
difficulties extending a physician’s legal obligations to non-patients, even if they 
have been in quite foreseeable contact with the physician’s actual patient and 
are easily identifiable.56 Thus, a physician faced no duty to warn the spouse in 
a case alleging the physician’s failure to diagnose the patient’s tuberculosis, 
because, the court reasoned, “‘[A] physician’s duty of care is ordinarily one owed 
to his or her patient’ and does not extend to the ‘community at large.’”57 
4.  Tarasoff’s Impact 
Discussion of physicians’ duties to protect community health must, of 
course, include the infamous Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California58 and 
related case law. In Tarasoff, the Supreme Court of California held that a 
psychologist has a duty to protect foreseeable third-party victims when 
reasonably determining that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to 
others.59 The Tarasoff court noted its holding was consistent with the earlier 
infectious disease case law in other jurisdictions imposing liability on physicians 
to third parties who contracted the patient’s contagious disease.60 Foreseeability 
of harm seemed very important to the court’s imposition of a duty, despite 
 
 54. Id. at 997. 
 55. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 41 
cmt. h (AM. L. INST. 2012) (“Some of the obligations of physicians to third parties, such as with 
patients who are HIV-infected, have been addressed by legislatures. In other areas, the case law is 
sufficiently mixed, the factual circumstances sufficiently varied . . . .”). 
 56. Ellis v. Peter, 211 A.D.2d 353, 353 (N.Y. 1995). 
 57. Id. at 356 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (first quoting Purdy v. Pub. Adm’r of 
Westchester Cnty., 526 N.E.2d 4, 8 (N.Y. 1988); and then quoting Eiseman v. New York, 511 N.E.2d 
1128, 1135 (N.Y. 1987)). 
 58. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
 59. Id. at 346. 
 60. Id. at 344. 
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uncertain therapeutic standards for accurately predicting patient violence. 61 
This foreseeability emphasis, as well as the opinion’s linking to earlier infectious 
disease cases, and that the facts involved noninfectious mental illness, 62 
seemingly opened the door to imposing duties on health care providers to non-
patients in many situations where action could possibly mitigate risk and 
safeguard community health. 
However, Tarasoff and its progeny really do not support the notion of a 
physician’s broader duty to protect the health of the population. Despite its 
wide renown, a fair number of jurisdictions decline to follow Tarasoff and do 
not recognize a duty on mental health care providers in similar situations.63 
Meanwhile, certain courts following Tarasoff hold that the duty of protection 
and/or warning is owed only to victims “who are identifiable with a significant 
degree of specificity.”64 This undercuts the notion that the physician owes a 
duty to protect the community’s health as there is a big leap from specifically 
identifiable third parties at risk to general members of the public. Additionally, 
some courts have distinguished Tarasoff and its progeny as limited to the unique, 
special relationship between a mental health provider and the patient, and state 
that such case law “cannot reasonably serve as a springboard for the imposition 
of new and broader duties upon healthcare providers vis-à-vis third-party non-
patients.”65 
One way to understand the distinctiveness of the special relationship 
recognized in Tarasoff arises from the mental health care provider’s assumption 
of some degree of control over and highly personal connection with the patient, 
elements not necessarily existing to the same extent in other doctor-patient 
relationships.66 For example, the typical mental health patient has “some degree 
of decreased capacity of self-control”67 and the therapist has the option of civilly 
committing the mental health patient.68 In contrast, the regular physician does 
 
 61. Id. at 345. 
 62. Id. at 344. 
 63. Kuligoski v. Brattleboro Retreat, 156 A.3d 436, 469 (Vt. 2016) (noting that many states have 
departed from Tarasoff through statutory limitations on the mental health professional’s duty). 
 64. Peter H. Schuck & Daniel J. Givelber, Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.: The Therapist’s 
Dilemma, in TORTS STORIES 99, 127 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003). 
 65. Seebold v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 57 A.3d 1232, 1244 (Pa. 2012). 
 66. Cf., e.g., Shortnacy v. N. Atlanta Internal Med., P.C., 556 S.E.2d 209, 214 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2001) (finding no duty in a case where an injured third party alleged the physician owed him a duty 
when prescribing patient-driver a narcotic analgesic—the court recognized “control over the patient as 
the touchstone for imposing this [physician] duty to third parties” and finding no duty because such 
control was lacking in this doctor-patient relationship). 
 67. W. Jonathan Cardi, A Pluralistic Analysis of the Therapist/Physician Duty To Warn Third Parties, 
44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 877, 889 (2009). 
 68. Id. at 891. 
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not have an “intimate knowledge of a patient’s life,” and the patient may be just 
as capable of exercising self-control to address the harm to others.69 
Relatedly, the Restatement (Third) of Torts expressly recognizes affirmative 
duties by mental health providers to third parties at risk from patients, but 
treats nonmental health professionals differently.70 Instead, it “leaves to further 
development the question of when [nonmental health] physicians have a duty 
to use reasonable care or some more limited duty—such as to warn only the 
patient—to protect third parties.”71 This further suggests that the grounds are 
weak for extending a Tarasoff-like duty beyond the unique mental health setting 
to a wider range of potential public health scenarios.72 
C. Medical Practice Acts and Professional Licensure 
Physicians have statutory and regulatory duties connected with the legal 
authority the government grants them to practice medicine. But this does not 
necessarily encompass broad public health obligations. Most state medical 
practice acts are patient focused and condition a physician’s ability to engage in 
the licensed practice of medicine on maintaining minimum quality standards in 
connection with services rendered to actual patients. For example, Ohio’s 
medical practice act provides that physicians can face licensure restriction for 
grounds primarily tied to direct patient care such as “inability to practice 
according to acceptable and prevailing standards of care by reason of mental 
illness or physical illness,” departure from minimal standards of care followed 
by similar physicians, failure to follow standards related to drug selection and 
administration, and violating patient confidentiality.73 
Only a handful of state medical practice acts extend further and expressly 
envision the licensed physician engaging in public health protection. As 
discussed further below, some licensing statutes provide that a physician’s 
failure to comply with infectious disease-reporting laws can trigger licensure 
discipline.74 Beyond this link to disease reporting, very few physician licensure 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 41(b)(4) (AM. L. INST. 2012). 
 71. Id. § 41 cmt. h. 
 72. The Restatement (Third) of Torts commentary discusses possible public health duties to third 
parties, such as when a physician cares for an HIV patient who poses risk to others. Id. But it notes 
that statutes may address some of these duties and that the case law and policy considerations are mixed 
when considering whether physicians have clear affirmative duties under common law to non-patient 
third parties. Id. (“Physicians’ reporting obligations for patients who are HIV-positive have been 
addressed by statute in virtually all states.”). 
 73. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B) (LEXIS through File 3 (SB 22) of the 134th (2021–
2022) Gen. Assemb.). 
 74. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-21 (Westlaw through L.2021, c. 32 and J.R. No. 1) (providing 
that engaging in professional misconduct is punishable by license suspension); N.J. ADMIN. CODE 
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statutes expressly address other public health conduct, and those situations seem 
to be ad hoc. An increasing number of medical practice acts, such as North 
Carolina’s, permit physicians to prescribe opioid antagonists, such as naloxone, 
to non-patients, including family members of individuals at risk of opioid 
overdose and others who are likely to be in a position to assist individuals at 
risk, to prevent overdoses.75 New York’s medical practice act permits physicians 
to prescribe generalized regimens to nurses and pharmacists for administering 
immunizations and performing identification tests with non-patients for 
infectious diseases such as influenza, pertussis disease, and hepatitis C virus.76 
On the one hand, licensure provisions as in New York and North Carolina 
provide a direct legal connection between physician action and non-patients. 
On the other hand, the statutory language is permissive, rather than a binding 
obligation. Thus, the familiar pattern occurs yet again: physicians’ public health 
duties are ephemeral in contrast to their more salient, binding obligations to 
actual patients. 
There is open-ended “harm to the public” language in some medical 
practice acts that could be expansively read to impose additional public health 
obligations on physicians. For example, Illinois’ medical practice act provides 
that physicians should avoid “unprofessional conduct of a character likely to 
deceive, defraud or harm the public.” 77  Similarly, the Federation of State 
Medical Boards (“FSMB”) published a model medical practice act provides that 
a physician may face licensure discipline for “conduct likely to . . . harm the 
public,” or “any conduct that may be harmful to the patient or the public.”78 
Such language arguably makes attention to population health risks a 
physician’s statutory responsibility, as disregard for these risks can materialize 
as harm to the public. However, the ultimate impact of these statutory 
provisions is in fact quite modest. First, a fair number of physician-licensing 
statutes do not follow the FSMB model and avoid the very broad “harm to the 
public” disciplinary standard. Second, even if on the books, medical boards do 
not regularly enforce a harm-to-the-public standard. To start, physician 
discipline for any licensure statute violation remains quite rare. Estimates 
suggest that state medical boards discipline only 5 in 1,000 physicians per year, 
and only approximately 1.1 per 1,000 physicians receive severe sanctions such 
 
§ 13:35-6.24 (LEXIS through the New Jersey Reg., Vol. 53 No. 7, Apr. 5, 2021) (providing that failure 
to comply with disease-reporting requirements can be considered professional misconduct). 
 75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-12.7(b) (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-4 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of 
the Gen. Assemb.). 
 76. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6527(6)–(7) (Westlaw through L.2021, chs. 1 to 49, 61 to 91). 
 77. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/22(A)(5) (Westlaw through P.A. 101-659). 
 78. ESSENTIALS OF A STATE MED. & OSTEOPATHIC PRAC. ACT § IX(D)(4), (52) (FED’N OF 
STATE MED. BDS. 2015), https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/policies/essentials-of-a-state-
medical-and-osteopathic-practice-act.pdf [https://perma.cc/G66H-JVU8]. 
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as revocation or suspension of their license.79 The overwhelming majority of 
serious medical licensure actions involve complaints of physicians impaired by 
drugs and alcohol, engaged in sexual relations with patients, and other quality 
of care concerns. 80  There is a noteworthy dearth of professional licensure 
actions for conduct involving harm to non-patients and the health of the 
community. 
Finally, a fair number of medical practice acts condition the physician’s 
license on complying with the ethics of the medical profession. Ohio’s licensing 
statute, for example, provides that physicians may face licensure discipline for 
violating the American Medical Association’s Code of Medical Ethics (“AMA 
Code”).81 Similarly, North Carolina’s licensing statute subjects a physician to 
potential discipline for “failure to conform to . . . the ethics of the medical 
profession, irrespective of whether or not a patient is injured thereby.”82 Thus, 
if medical ethics and the honorable standards of the profession direct physicians 
to safeguard public health, then failure to do so could also be considered a 
licensure violation. This would be the case even if no patient harm occurred. 
The extent to which medical ethical directives can be considered binding 
legal obligations, because medical practice acts reference such ethical standards, 
is much debated. Some commentators assert that private professional 
associations, such as the American Medical Association (“AMA”), have no legal 
role in directing the practice of medicine through licensing statutes and that 
violations of such associations’ ethical codes are not strong grounds for 
jeopardizing the physician’s license. 83  However, other commentators see a 
firmer legal foundation, particularly for the AMA Code, and contend that it has 
“been adopted as an authoritative source of a physicians’ professional 
responsibilities by many state licensing boards and courts.”84 
To the extent these ethical standards are at least influential in 
understanding the full scope of physicians’ legal duties, it is helpful to consider 
medical ethics guidance regarding physicians as agents of community health. 
 
 79. James M. Dubois, Emily A. Anderson, John T. Chibnall, Leanne Diakov, David J. Doukas, 
Eric S. Holmboe, Heidi M. Koenig, Joan H. Krause, Gianna McMillan, Marc Mendelsohn, Jessica 
Mozersky, William A. Norcross & Alison J. Whelan, Preventing Egregious Ethical Violations in Medical 
Practice: Evidence-Informed Recommendations from a Multidisciplinary Working Group, 104 J. MED. REG. 
23, 23 (2018). 
 80. James M. Dubois, Emily E. Anderson, John T. Chibnall, Jessica Mozersky & Heidi A. Walsh, 
Serious Ethical Violations in Medicine: A Statistical and Ethical Analysis of 280 Cases in the United States 
from 2008–2016, 19 AM. J. BIOETHICS 16, 16 (2019). 
 81. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B) (LEXIS through File 3 (SB 22) of the 134th (2020–
2021) Gen. Assemb.). 
 82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14(a)(6) (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-4 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of 
the Gen. Assemb.). 
 83. Carl H. Coleman, Beyond the Call of Duty: Compelling Health Care Professionals To Work During 
an Influenza Pandemic, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1, 22 (2008). 
 84. Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 1459. 
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Moreover, in situations where the law may not provide a clear answer about 
physicians’ public health duties, the ethical provisions become all the more 
important, pragmatically, as a source of authority in directing physician 
behavior because parties may turn to the ethical standards for additional 
guidance. Thus, more detailed consideration of how medical ethics addresses 
physicians’ public health duties is in order, and the next part takes up this 
analysis.85 
D. Other Statutory Duties 
In contrast to medical practice acts, various other statutes provide clearer 
legal foundation for physicians’ public heath responsibilities, albeit in narrow 
contexts. First, some statutes impose direct public health surveillance 
responsibilities on treating clinicians, such as laws that require reporting of 
communicable disease,86 child abuse and neglect,87 and elder abuse.88 Failure to 
comply with reporting obligations can subject a physician to licensure discipline 
in several states. 89  However, as discussed further below, compliance with 
disease-reporting laws has been poor and enforcement weak.90 
Some statutes permit commandeering the services of private physicians in 
the declaration of a public health emergency. For example, the Model State 
Emergency Health Powers Act,91 adopted in varying form in several states, 
provides state public health authorities the power to require physicians to assist 
with vaccination, testing, examination, and treatment of individuals.92 But such 
commandeering statutes typically apply only in the context of a discrete, 
declared public health emergency, not to the more mundane, daily treatment 
 
 85. See infra Part II. 
 86. See infra Section III.C. 
 87. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166(a) (2021) (requiring physicians to report known or 
suspected instances of child abuse or neglect). 
 88. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15630 (2021) (requiring physicians to report known 
or observed instances of elder abuse or neglect). 
 89. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6530 (Westlaw through L.2021, chs. 1 to 49, 61 to 91) (stating 
that failure to report constitutes professional misconduct); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230-a (Westlaw 
through L.2021, chs. 1 to 49, 61 to 91) (providing that engaging in professional misconduct subjects a 
physician to licensure revocation). 
 90. See infra Section III.C. 
 91. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY POWERS ACT (CTR. FOR L. & THE PUB.’S HEALTH AT 
GEORGETOWN & JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVS., Discussion Draft 2001), https://www.aapsonline.org/ 
legis/msehpa2.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5JK-DNE3]. 
 92. See NETWORK FOR PUB. HEALTH L., THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH 
POWERS ACT: SUMMARY MATRIX 1–8, https://www.networkforphl.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2020/01/Emergency-Declaration-Authorities.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TAV-X6QB] (providing “state 
statutory and regulatory authorities for emergency declarations in all 50 U.S. States and the District of 
Columbia”); see also Judith C. Ahronheim, Service by Health Care Providers in a Public Health Emergency: 
The Physician’s Duty and the Law, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 195, 229 (2009). 
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decisions arising in clinical practice that, nonetheless, may also impact 
community health significantly. 
Physicians providing on-call service at a Medicare-participating hospital 
may also have an obligation to treat individuals during a public health 
emergency under the Federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor 
Act (“EMTALA”).93 But the ultimate reach of this statutory duty remains quite 
constrained as EMTALA applies only when individuals present at a hospital 
emergency room.94 In regular clinical practice, outside of the emergency room 
context, the common-law view of the doctor-patient relationship as contractual 
in nature gives physicians considerable leeway to decline to start a treatment 
relationship for any reason or no real reason at all.95 This presumably grants 
physicians discretion to refuse to care for an individual, even when the 
underlying health condition, if left untreated, poses additional health risks to 
the community. 
II.  MEDICAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL NORMS AMPLIFYING PATIENT 
PRIMACY 
Law is not the only, or even most significant, influence on physician 
behavior. Among other factors, physicians’ sense of their professional ethical 
obligations, as well as what they perceive their peers do, can matter 
considerably. Thus, in accounting for the elusiveness of physicians’ public 
health responsibilities, it is also important to consider these additional 
perspectives. Medical ethics and professional norms reinforce and amplify law’s 
patient-primacy directive. While nominally acknowledging physicians’ public 
health obligations, medical ethics and professional norms more frequently 
downgrade physicians’ public health activities when in tension with patient-
centered responsibilities. 
A. Traditional Medical Ethics 
According to traditional medical ethics, the doctor-patient relationship 
serves as the linchpin for the origin and scope of a physician’s ethical 
obligations.96 The AMA Code treats the physician’s role as inherently patient-
centered because “[t]he practice of medicine . . . is fundamentally a moral 
activity that arises from the imperative to care for patients and to alleviate 
 
 93. See Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9121, 
100 Stat. 82, 164–67 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See, e.g., Oliver v. Brock, 342 So. 2d 1, 3 (Ala. 1976). 
 96. As previously noted, there are differing opinions on whether professional ethical codes and 
directives are considered binding legal obligations on physicians. See supra Section I.C. 
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suffering.” 97  Interestingly, the AMA Code has not always been so feeble 
regarding the physician’s public health role. The first version of the AMA Code, 
from 1847, took a rather firm stand on the necessity of physicians addressing 
infectious disease outbreaks threatening the community, even if this meant 
putting themselves at risk. 98 It advised that “when pestilence prevails, it is 
[physicians’] duty to face the danger, and to continue their labors for the 
alleviation of the suffering, even at the jeopardy of their own lives.”99 
In contrast, the current AMA Code makes physicians’ public health duties 
more obscure. Among the AMA Code’s nine core principles is a seemingly bold 
endorsement of a robust public health role for the physician: “A physician shall 
recognize a responsibility to participate in activities contributing to the 
improvement of the community and the betterment of public health.”100 Note 
the rather weakened effect of the indirect phrasing, however, as the physician 
is advised merely to recognize a public health responsibility as opposed to 
actually having to undertake it to a meaningful degree. Further, the next 
immediately following core principle significantly undercuts physicians’ 
obligations to improve public health as it instructs that “[a] physician shall, 
while caring for the patient, regard responsibility to the patient as paramount.”101 
Thus, any public health role envisioned by the AMA Code’s core principles is 
fairly read to be secondary and inferior to the clearer command for the physician 
to act primarily for the patient being treated. More to the point, the AMA Code 
regards the doctor-patient relationship as so sacrosanct and rooted in trust that 
it obligates physicians to “place patients’ welfare above the physician’s own self-
interest or obligations to others.”102 Thus, physicians’ responsibilities to safeguard 
the health of the community take a backseat to caring for individual patients. 
The AMA Code underwent significant revisions in 2016, including, 
importantly, a reorganized series of ethics opinions in Chapter 8 that addresses 
“Opinions On Physicians [and] the Health of the Community.” 103  These 
opinions describe various public health obligations for physicians, such as 
participating in routine universal patient screening for HIV, assessing patients’ 
fitness to drive, providing urgent medical care during disasters, and 
participating in use of quarantine and isolation procedures to control infectious 
 
 97. CODE OF MED. ETHICS ch. 1, Ethics Op. 1.1.1 (AM. MED. ASS’N 2017), https://www.ama-
assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/patient-physician-relationships [https://perma.cc/47R8-TSUT]. 
 98. CODE OF MED. ETHICS art. 1, § 1 (AM. MED. ASS’N 1847). 
 99. Id. 
 100. CODE OF MED. ETHICS, AMA PRINCIPLES OF MED. ETHICS § VII (AM. MED. ASS’N 
2001), https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/principles-of-medical-
ethics.pdf [https://perma.cc/5X6Z-4URQ]. 
 101. Id. § VIII (emphasis added). 
 102. CODE OF MED. ETHICS ch. 1, Ethics Op. 1.1.1 (emphasis added). 
 103. CODE OF MED. ETHICS, ch. 8. 
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disease outbreaks.104 The AMA webpage introducing this revised Chapter 8 
promotes physicians as strong public health guardians by explaining 
“[p]hysicians have a long-recognized responsibility to participate in activities to 
protect and promote the health of the public.”105 
Yet much of this guidance pays mere lip service to physicians’ public 
health role. The “long-recognized” public health duties are immediately 
attenuated by the physician’s need to care for her patients. The Chapter 8 
webpage further cautions that “[p]hysicians must balance dual responsibilities 
to promote the welfare and confidentiality of the individual patient and to 
protect public safety.”106 This suggests the physician has dual duties—to the 
patient and to public health—without much guidance as to how to reconcile any 
tensions. The actual ethics opinions within Chapter 8 go further, however, in 
making clear that the public health role remains necessarily inferior. For 
example, Ethics Opinion 8.1, dealing with the importance of physician 
participation in routine universal screening of patients for HIV, begins the 
analysis with the starting assumption that “[p]hysicians’ primary ethical 
obligation is to their individual patients”107 and thus advises that HIV screening 
include opt-out provisions for patients and that physicians should respect a 
patient’s informed refusal to be tested for HIV as part of routine screening.108 
Likewise, Ethics Opinion 8.4, addressing physicians’ public health 
responsibilities to consider use of quarantine and isolation to reduce infectious 
disease outbreaks, makes clear that physicians’ obligations to the patient remain 
superior. 109  The opinion notes that “[a]lthough physicians’ primary ethical 
obligation is to their individual patients, they also have a long-recognized public 
health responsibility. . . . [T]his may include the use of quarantine and isolation 
to . . . protect the health of the public.”110 Elsewhere in the Chapter 8 ethics 
opinions, physicians’ public health duties are ambiguously referenced as 
concurrent with their obligations to individual patients, but again no guidance 
is given about how to reconcile any dual-obligation problems. 111  More 
importantly, nowhere within the Chapter 8 ethics opinions is there any 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Code of Medical Ethics: Physicians & the Health of the Community, AM. MED. ASS’N, https:// 
www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/code-medical-ethics-physicians-health-community [https:// 
perma.cc/T7X4-G6CT]. 
 106. Id. 
 107. CODE OF MED. ETHICS ch. 8, Ethics Op. 8.1. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. ch. 8, Ethics Op. 8.4. 
 110. Id. (emphasis added). 
 111. See, e.g., id. ch. 8, Ethics Op. 8.2 (“In deciding whether or how to intervene when a patient’s 
medical condition may impair driving, physicians must balance dual responsibilities to promote the 
welfare and confidentiality of the individual patient, and to protect public safety.”). 
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indication when physicians’ public health duties will ever eclipse and outweigh 
their obligations to individual patients.112 
Analogous to public health protection is the expectation that physicians 
should adopt conscious practice strategies in order to help control health care 
spending. In this context, the AMA ethics guidance offers some support for 
relaxing patient primacy in favor of larger societal interests.113 It is not clear, 
however, that this guidance is intended to apply to physician’s specific public 
health activities. Moreover, recognizing physicians have dual obligations, 
without providing clearer indication when societal interests must take center 
stage, still results in underpowered public health obligations. 
The failure of traditional medical ethics to support more robust public 
health duties for physicians, and its seeming enfeeblement of such duties by 
obfuscation, should not surprise. Organized medicine has historically had a 
tense relationship with public health. In earlier decades, private physicians 
viewed public health workers’ attempts at professionalization with suspicion 
and warily regarded the public health movement’s appeals to community 
protection as a means to introduce controversial health insurance programs and 
to assert control over individual medical practice.114 Also contributing to this 
tension was public health linking disease prevention to the “higher rights” of 
the community, and its advocacy for mass intervention programs, which 
seemingly undercut the doctor-patient relationship so central to medical 
practice.115 
In addition, traditional medical ethics’ emphasis on values such as 
autonomy, civil liberty, and antipaternalism remains at odds with public heath’s 
more communitarian orientation.116 Traditional medical ethics’ strong concern 
with individual autonomy and patient beneficence, in particular, contrasts with 
public health’s attention to how health-related risks and benefits impact entire 
 
 112. See id. ch. 8. 
 113. See AM. MED. ASS’N, Opinion 9.0652 - Physician Stewardship of Health Care Resources, 
reprinted in 17 AMA J. ETHICS 1044, 1044 (2015); AM. MED. ASS’N, REPS. OF THE COUNCIL ON 
ETHICAL & JUD. AFFS., PHYSICIAN STEWARDSHIP OF HEALTH CARE RESOURCES 
(2012),  https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/public/hod/a12-ceja-
reports_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/MM76-95PY]. According to the AMA report, the singular patient 
welfare view does not reflect the realities of clinical practice and overlooks physicians’ distinct 
obligations to promote public health and access to care generally. Id. 
 114. Daniel M. Fox, From TB to AIDS: Value Conflicts in Reporting Disease, 16 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 
11, 13 (1986). 
 115. Id. at 13; A.R. Ruis & Robert N. Golden, The Schism Between Medical and Public Health 
Education: A Historical Perspective, 83 ACAD. MED. 1153, 1154 (2008). 
 116. Daniel Callahan & Bruce Jennings, Ethics and Public Health: Forging a Strong Relationship, 92 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 169, 170 (2002). 
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populations.117 Public health ends up placing higher ethical priority on utility 
and intrinsic outcomes than traditional medical ethics.118 
In some respects, medical ethics guidance resembles ethical standards from 
other professions because of the shared emphasis on relational obligations and 
loyalty to the professional’s “client.” For example, traditional legal ethics 
generally instructed the attorney to put the client’s interests first and expected 
very little of lawyers in terms of the interests of the community. Under the 
traditional view, “the only ethical duty distinctive to the lawyer’s role is loyalty 
to the client. Legal ethics impose no responsibilities to third parties or the 
public different from that of the minimal compliance with law that is required 
of everyone.” 119  The updated American Bar Association Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct (“ABA Model Rules”) are more ambivalent about the 
lawyer’s primary role as zealous advocate, contending that a lawyer, in addition 
to a representative of the client, acts as “a public citizen having special 
responsibility for the quality of justice.” 120  Attorneys also have duties as 
“officers of the court” that may conflict with zealous client representation, such 
as not making false statements to a tribunal and not advising opposing parties 
unrepresented by counsel.121 These extra client responsibilities are largely about 
the lawyer’s conduct in preserving the integrity of the adjudicative process and 
legal institutions.122 
One might question why determining physician’s responsibilities beyond 
the patient is really any different or more difficult than how the legal profession 
addresses the question of duties beyond the client. However, the physician’s 
role is not really comparable to the lawyer’s more constrained function of 
advocacy within a dispute resolution system, raising doubts about the usefulness 
 
 117. Lawrence O. Gostin & Lindsey F. Wiley, Public Health Ethics and Law, HASTINGS CTR. 
BIOETHICS BRIEFINGS (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.thehastingscenter.org/briefingbook/public-
health/ [https://perma.cc/7HZS-HBTP]. 
 118. Anna C. Mastroianni, Jeffrey P. Kahn & Nancy E. Kass, Public Health Ethics: An Introduction 
and Overview, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS, at xxxii (Anna C. 
Mastroianni, Jeffrey P. Kahn & Nancy E. Kass eds., 2019). 
 119. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 8 
(1998). 
 120. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. § 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). The ABA Model 
Rules also temper the lawyer’s zealous advocacy role by stating such advocacy must still be “within the 
bounds of law, while maintaining a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons 
involved in the legal system.” Id. pmbl. § 9; see also David Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 873, 883–84 (1999). 
 121. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.3; MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.3; 
Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 60–61 (1989). 
 122. One possible exception is Rule 1.6(b)—the ethical rule permitting lawyers to breach client 
confidences to prevent reasonably certain death, substantial bodily harm, or crime/fraud in which the 
lawyer’s services were used. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6(b). Rule 1.6(b) more directly 
prevents community members from harm, as much as it helps preserve the integrity of legal dispute 
resolution. However, Rule 1.6(b) is permissive, not a binding duty, and in any event applies only in 
very limited factual scenarios. 
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of generalizing from legal ethics to medical ethics.123 Also, private physicians 
might be thought to have more robust societal obligations because of their quasi-
public status, given their participation in governmental health care programs 
like Medicare and their role as gatekeeper to limited health care resources. 
Further, medical ethics is ultimately distinguishable from legal ethics in how it 
treats the professional’s responsibilities to society. Lawyers’ ethical 
responsibilities to society seem largely directed at preserving the institutional 
integrity of the judicial system and the quality of the adjudicative process, so 
that all deserving parties using legal services may secure justice. But 
conventional medical ethics expressly mentions physicians’ obligations to better 
public health as an independent responsibility of the professional, not 
necessarily connected to caring for the patient or safeguarding particular health 
care institutions. 124 Medical ethics seemingly endorses a larger, autonomous 
role for physicians to act for the interests of the populace, yet significantly 
undermines this role by also insisting that physicians always prioritize patient 
care. Thus, medical ethics ultimately makes the question of the professional’s 
community responsibilities far more elusive. Following this guidance, 
physicians must struggle with the incongruity of “being a perfect agent for the 
patient and being the protector of society.”125 
B. Public Health Ethics 
Newer professional guidance, beyond the AMA Code, attempts to address 
more squarely the ethical tensions that arise in public health practice and 
safeguarding the community at large. For example, the Public Health 
Leadership Society Code (“PHLS Code”) developed by the Public Health 
Leadership Society,126 and formally adopted by the American Public Health 
Association, 127  notes that “[t]he concerns of public health are not fully 
consonant with those of medicine, . . . thus we cannot simply translate the 
[traditional] principles of medical ethics to public health. . . . [I]n contrast to 
medicine, public health is concerned more with populations than with 
 
 123. See William M. Sage, Physicians as Advocates, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 1529, 1532 (1999) (“To a 
lawyer, advocating for clients means playing a focused, instrumental part in a broader social system of 
dispute resolution. Doctors do not see their role as similarly limited. Rather, physicians have served as 
counsel, judge, and jury—articulating possibilities, presenting and weighing evidence, balancing 
competing considerations, and arriving at a decision as to the manner in which the resources of the 
health care system should be brought to bear on illness or injury.”). 
 124. See supra notes 100–05 and accompanying text. 
 125. Sage, supra note 123, at 1578. 
 126. See PUB. HEALTH LEADERSHIP SOC’Y, PRINCIPLES OF THE ETHICAL PRACTICE 
OF  PUBLIC HEALTH (2002), https://www.apha.org/-/media/files/pdf/membergroups/ethics/ethics 
_brochure.ashx [https://perma.cc/PAL9-6XEV]. 
 127. See James C. Thompson, Michael Sage, Jack Dillenberg & V. James Guillory, A Code of Ethics 
for Public Health, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1057, 1058 (2002). 
99 N.C. L. REV. 923 (2021) 
948 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99-4 
individuals.”128 As previously noted, the AMA Code recognizes physicians have 
public health and individual patient responsibilities, but in rather wishy-washy 
fashion states these dual obligations should be “balanced” without saying much 
more how to do so or, alternatively, makes quite plain the higher priority of 
individual patient welfare. In contrast, the PHLS Code provides support for 
tipping the balance more readily in favor of community interests: 
[There is] the common need in public health to weigh the concerns of 
both the individual and the community. There is no ethical principle that 
can provide a solution to this perennial tension in public health. We can 
highlight, however, that the interest of the community is part of the 
equation, and for public health it is the starting place in the equation; it is the 
primary interest of public health.129 
While offering a provocative alternative perspective to the AMA Code 
about the dual-obligation problems for physicians in addressing individual 
versus public health, the PHLS Code likely holds little sway over community 
physicians. It is not even necessarily applicable to private physicians in ordinary 
clinical settings. The PHLS Code follows the longstanding sharp division 
between individual medicine and public health, stating that it is intended 
primarily for “public and other institutions . . . that have an explicit public 
health mission,” whereas regular clinicians are advised merely that they “may 
also find the [PHLS] Code relevant and useful.”130 
C. Medical Norms 
Medicine’s professional norms also slight the health needs of the 
community in favor of patient primacy. New physicians become members of a 
medical culture that emphasizes fidelity to, and doing the best possible for, the 
patient at hand. Indeed, most medical school graduates take formal pledges to 
put the patient’s welfare first, with common language such as “[t]he health and 
life of my patient will be my first consideration.”131 Acting as a gatekeeper and 
other public health-oriented actions fit awkwardly with this sense of 
professional mission.132 
Part of medical culture’s discomfort with public health arises from how 
physicians are educated and trained. Medical education historically paid little 
attention to public health topics. Influential groups such as the Institute of 
Medicine have called for medical schools to provide greater training in public 
 
 128. PUB. HEALTH LEADERSHIP SOC’Y, supra note 126, at 5. 
 129. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
 130. Id. at 1. 
 131. See Audiey C. Kao & Kayhan P. Parsi, Content Analyses of Oaths Administered at U.S. Medical 
Schools in 2000, 79 ACAD. MED. 882, 884 (2004). 
 132. JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK 82 (2007) (“Alas, serving as a gatekeeper to 
limit access is not what most doctors envisioned when they chose primary care.”). 
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health and population-based prevention strategies.133 Indeed, there is a growing 
consensus that “contemporary health challenges facing physicians will not be 
solved by clinical care alone. In our increasingly complex healthcare 
environment, physicians will need to integrate population-based management 
strategies . . . to optimally meet direct care needs . . . .”134 However, effective 
integration of public health into the medical school curriculum has proven quite 
challenging for many reasons, including competing demands of more 
conventional medical topics, and medical students report dissatisfaction with 
their training in core public health competencies.135 
Further, the fact that much of physicians’ work is treatment oriented 
around particular episodes of care makes it harder for physicians to adopt 
population-based perspectives in their decision-making. The understandable 
default norm is to deal with the patient at hand, case by case. As the ACS noted 
in its COVID-19 pandemic guidance: 
Most physicians . . . are used to making decisions based on what is best 
for each individual patient. . . . [Now i]t is no longer a matter of what 
will be best for each individual patient, but rather, what is best for the 
group. . . . [I]t is an approach to which many of us are unaccustomed.136 
Indeed, medical norms encourage physicians to treat individual patients 
differently from abstract groups of patients or the “community” at large. 
Studies indicate that physicians have stronger feelings of obligation to help 
individually known patients, as opposed to more diffuse groups like future 
patients or the general public. 137  This reflects the centrality of the healing 
relationship with patients to physicians’ sense of professional identity. Just as 
health law more readily finds the physicians’ duties arising from and defined in 
relation to an individual patient, physicians themselves apparently feel a greater 
sense of obligation to patients actively under their care, not other groups and, 
therefore, not the populace. This is consistent with the higher value often placed 
 
 133. INST. OF MED., WHO WILL KEEP THE PUBLIC HEALTHY?: EDUCATING PUBLIC HEALTH 
PROFESSIONALS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 135 (Kristine Gebbie, Linda Rosenstock & Lyla M. 
Hernandez eds., 2003). 
 134. Christopher P. Morley, Scott R. Rosas, Ranit Mishori, William Jordan, Yumi Shitama Jarris, 
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 135. Kevin Correll Keith, Bethany Carlos, Michele Friesinger, Kemp Anderson, Kelsey Wilson, 
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 136. Ethical Considerations, AM. COLL. SURGEONS (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.facs.org/covid-
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on identifiable rather than statistical lives, a bias that complicates effective 
policy making in public health.138 
III.  RISK EXTERNALIZATION TO THE PUBLIC 
The patient-primacy directive, combined with the elusiveness of 
physicians’ public health duties, enables externalization of health risks from 
patients to the population at large. This problematic risk externalization occurs 
not only during times of public health crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic, but 
also in more seemingly stable periods. Indeed, the risks are often insidious, 
presenting ongoing threats to community health. This part considers examples 
across the wide public health space: COVID-19, antibiotic resistance, infectious 
disease reporting, opioid prescribing, and gun violence. 
A. COVID-19 
One important public health strategy deployed during the COVID-19 
pandemic has been delay of elective procedures for non-COVID-19 patients. 
This can help minimize virus transmission opportunities and preserve the 
health care system’s limited capacity, including equipment and staffing, for 
fighting COVID-19. Of course, the term “elective” is somewhat misleading and 
highly contestable, as seen by controversies and differing court opinions 
regarding attempts by some states to halt abortions as elective procedures.139 
Rather than a binary choice between clearly elective and nonelective, most 
medical procedures likely align on a spectrum from emergency to urgent to 
essential to nonessential, and delays present varying degrees of impediment and 
risk to different patients undergoing the same procedures. 
In March 2020, a growing public health consensus emerged favoring a 
pause in nonessential care. Governmental agencies like the CDC and 
professional associations like the ACS issued recommendations along these 
lines.140 Eventually, many states moved beyond the advisory stage and imposed 
 
 138. Id. at 1164. 
 139. Compare S. Wind Women’s Ctr. LLC v. Stitt, 455 F. Supp. 3d 1219, 1231 (W.D. Okla. 2020) 
(holding abortions to be elective, but counter to the governor’s COVID-19 directive, that prohibiting 
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 140. COVID-19: Recommendations for Management of Elective Surgical Procedures, AM. 
COLL. SURGEONS (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.facs.org/covid-19/clinical-guidance/elective-surgery 
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uniform restrictions on elective procedures, often through executive orders 
from governors and state health departments.141 
Interestingly, before states imposed more uniform restrictions, and yet 
while the community health risks of elective procedures were highlighted in 
vigorous public debate,142 several physicians continued to perform procedures 
generally considered less essential and nonurgent, like spinal decompression 
and Tommy John surgery.143 These physicians defended their conduct based on 
doing the best for the patients under their care. For example, Dr. Neal 
ElAttrache, a highly regarded orthopedic surgeon and president of the 
American Orthopaedic Society for Sports Medicine, performed Tommy John 
surgery on several athletes during this period. 144 Acknowledging the public 
health risks, he maintained that he was obligated to cure his patients and 
remained focused on how delays would affect them personally, observing, 
“[Y]ou have somebody’s career at stake and they lose two seasons instead of 
one.”145 Likewise, many dermatology practices remained open in late March, 
despite public health calls to limit such in-person care, and in apparent 
contradiction of guidelines from the American Academy of Dermatology to 
reschedule all nonessential visits or instead switch to telemedicine.146 
Reasons beyond patient primacy likely motivated these providers to keep 
offering such nonessential services amid a pandemic, such as physicians’ desire 
to stay active and hopes that treatment protocols could be improved with 
experience. Undoubtedly, economic considerations mattered as physician 
practices faced significant financial losses from restricting services. Many of the 
dermatology practices that remained open in this period were owned by private 
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equity firms and faced pressures to generate practice revenues for investors.147 
But the physicians’ stated reasons, even if somewhat pretextual, for continuing 
these services predictably referenced the patient-primacy directive and doing 
what was best for their patients. Thus, it would be wrong to dismiss these 
physicians as outliers. The more general and concerning point is that because 
their public health responsibilities were so elusive, these physicians had 
considerable discretion to downgrade public health concerns to an alarming 
degree and faced no legal repercussions for doing so. Meanwhile, the “patients 
first” rationale was so broad and seemingly beyond reproach that it could 
obscure financial incentives and other questionable reasons at odds with 
community health protection. 
In urging physicians to delay less-essential procedures, professional 
societies like the ACS issued thoughtful guidance about how surgeons should 
prioritize services amid a pandemic.148 However admirable, the ACS guidance 
also reflected the still overwhelming influence of patient primacy. It argued that 
“in periods of absolute scarcity of resources, public health ethics is the far more 
responsible framework to adopt.”149 This reasoning, unfortunately, ignores how 
insufficient attention to public health effects can endanger the health of the 
community even in mundane periods between declared emergencies. 150  If 
physicians recognize and embrace public heath duties only when resources are 
already significantly limited, it will likely be too little, too late. 
Likewise, during the COVID-19 surge in December 2020, the National 
Academy of Medicine (“NAM”), the AMA, and other provider organizations 
called for regulatory support for shifting from typical delivery methods to 
“crisis standards of care.” 151  They argued that because the pandemic had 
severely strained resources, decisions needed to be made, such as canceling 
nonemergency procedures, “to do the most good possible for the largest 
number.”152 Yet even with this call for a more express public health orientation 
in practice standards, ensuring public health concerns command sufficient 
physician attention still has proven difficult. This is due to the considerable 
orbital pull of patient primacy. For example, NAM’s more specific guidance to 
individual health care providers about incorporating crisis standards of care 
expects, somewhat incongruously, that a physician account for community 
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needs while also assuming a duty of care “for each patient, without bias, to the 
best of your ability.”153 
At the other end of the spectrum, heightened attention to COVID-19 
patients in certain instances may have unintentionally endangered community 
health by glossing over negative spillover effects for the population. For 
example, pediatric vaccination rates dangerously plummeted during the early 
months of the pandemic, increasing community health risks due to potential 
loss of herd immunity and transmission of vaccine-preventable diseases. 154 
While this was in part due to parental fears about children acquiring COVID-
19 in doctors’ offices, health care providers’ reduced availability of well-child 
visits likely also interfered with needed vaccination schedules.155 
Many public health interventions focus on prevention. Health researchers 
worry that the delay of preventive care during the pandemic, such as 
colonoscopies and mammograms, will end up posing serious long-term health 
risks for the population, with potentially higher incidence rates of cancer and 
other diseases.156 Similarly, to preserve resources and manpower for COVID-
19 patients, several medical centers mandatorily suspended all their ongoing 
clinical trials in the early months of the pandemic.157 Such aggressive action 
seems justified when focused on doing what is best for COVID-19 patients. But 
it discounts resulting health risks for the population as “[o]ngoing trials have 
potential to benefit millions of people with debilitating chronic diseases long 
after the coronavirus pandemic has ended.”158 
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B. Antibiotic Prescribing 
The “antibiotic paradox” means that prescribing an antibiotic can have 
dual, contradictory effects—combatting targeted illness for one patient while 
also increasing resistant bacterial strains in the community and jeopardizing the 
medication’s effectiveness when used again for future health threats.159 Thus, 
for public health reasons, physicians must sometimes conserve use of antibiotics 
when the medication might offer only marginal benefit to the patient, because 
of the larger concern of minimizing bacterial resistance. 
Yet physicians have performed poorly as prudent stewards of the antibiotic 
supply.160 Studies suggest that physicians frequently engage in inappropriate 
antibiotic prescribing, over ordering the drugs by as much as fifty percent and 
contributing to resistance pressures.161 Inappropriate prescribing includes not 
only ordering antibiotics for viral infections, for which the drugs are ineffective, 
but also prescribing the medications at incorrect dosage and intervals, failure to 
monitor patients’ use of the medications after ordered, and using broad-
spectrum agents when narrower-spectrum drugs would suffice.162 
Taking on the necessary gatekeeping responsibilities runs counter to 
physicians’ preferred and seemingly simpler role as zealous healers for 
individual patients. Indeed, evidence suggests that physicians privilege their 
patients and do not attach sufficient weight to public health concerns when 
deciding on a course of antibiotic therapy. 163 In a study of attitudes about 
antibiotic prescribing, researchers asked a national sample of physicians to opine 
about which types of drugs they would order for a sample patient with 
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community-acquired pneumonia.164 The physicians were more likely to order 
new broad-spectrum drugs even though infectious disease guidelines 
recommended use of other antibiotics to minimize resistance pressures.165 Even 
more revealing, when asked to rank which factors (such as side effects, efficacy, 
and cost to patient) mattered most in their decision-making, most physicians 
placed the societal risk of antibiotic resistance at or very near the bottom.166 The 
study authors concluded from the data that whenever faced with the tension 
between following the interests of the individual patient and population health 
concerns about antibiotic resistance, physicians discounted the public 
interest.167 
Antibiotic resistance dramatically demonstrates the fallacy of the 
medicine/public health divide. Decisions within the confines of an individual 
doctor-patient relationship cannot be neatly sequestered from the health of the 
population. Indeed, antibiotic resistance problems usually start in local regions, 
such as a single hospital or clinic through institution-acquired infection or in 
small geographic areas, and then spread outward. In these localized 
environments the actions of just a small number of physicians with sufficient 
patient load can introduce strong selection pressures for resistant disease strains 
that affect the entire community.168 
Law’s patient-primacy directive seems to discourage physicians from 
engaging in antibiotic conservation. First, consider informed consent. Informed 
consent doctrine generally requires a physician to advise the patient about a 
proposed treatment’s material risks. But the law is so patient focused that courts 
conceive of these risks as the harms that may materialize for the patient, not the 
populace.169 A physician is under no legal obligation to inform the patient about 
the resistance risks and dangers to community health from inappropriate 
antibiotic use, such as if the patient fails to adhere to the medication schedule.170 
Second, fiduciary duty obligations also may be at odds with prudent 
antibiotic stewardship. For example, antibiotic resistance concerns would 
counsel physicians to restrict antibiotic use to only high-value uses for their 
patients and to avoid initially prescribing where the patient only might benefit 
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and where the degree of benefit is likely small. 171  Another antibiotic 
conservation technique is to cycle medications, deliberately altering and 
rotating different classes of antibiotics in episodes of care for particular 
patients.172 But fiduciary duty problems can arguably arise if a physician follows 
these strategies. A physician is not clearly acting as a fiduciary in advancing the 
patient’s interests above all others if the physician restricts the patient from 
even marginal benefits of using a medication. Likewise, a physician who cycles 
medications may override a patient’s legitimate preferences for one drug over 
another, given differences in side effects and costs among other reasons. 
C. Disease Reporting 
Disease surveillance, a fundamental public health activity, provides the 
critical foundation for contact tracing, resource mobilization, education, 
planning, and other control and prevention measures. 173  As part of disease 
surveillance, every state has statutory and regulatory requirements that 
physicians, clinical laboratories, and select other health care providers report 
various infectious disease cases to public health authorities. 174  Penalties for 
noncompliance are usually modest. As an illustration, Florida’s statute provides 
for misdemeanor civil fines up to $500.175 A few disease-reporting statutes also 
impose potential criminal sanctions, but the penalties are rarely applied.176 As 
previously noted, a few states’ medical practice acts expressly condition 
physician licensure on compliance with disease-reporting obligations, although 
actual licensure discipline for nonreporting seems quite rare. 177 Finally, the 
existence of a disease-reporting statute may be used to establish a duty and 
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define the standard of care in private common-law claims against physicians for 
third-party exposure to infectious disease.178 
Despite the clear statutory mandates, community physicians show little 
enthusiasm for following disease-reporting requirements. Compliance has been 
characterized as “inconsistent, infrequent, and delayed.” 179  Physicians have 
historically performed poorly as mandatory reporters. 180  Surveys show 
compliance rates ranging from about forty to fifty-six percent for common 
sexually transmitted diseases such as chlamydia and AIDS.181 
Physician noncompliance may, at first blush, seem largely a problem of lax 
enforcement and insufficient deterrence incentives. As noted, the direct and 
indirect sanctions for noncompliance are limited and rarely applied. In this 
respect, physicians’ disease-reporting duties follow the elusivity pattern. The 
legal requirements are more law-in-books than law-in-action: acknowledged but 
not really commanding influence. But the noncompliance problems indicate 
deeper problems of physician disengagement. After all, individuals adhere to 
mandates and statutory obligations, even when infrequently enforced, when 
they have more intrinsic motivations for compliance.182 With regard to disease 
reporting, however, physicians apparently have limited intrinsic motivation, 
reflecting the underweighting of public health considerations. The stated 
reasons for physician noncompliance have varied over time, including concerns 
of patient confidentiality, technical questions about the utility of the case 
reports themselves, and confusion as to which diseases are reportable. 183 
Additional factors frequently mentioned include the burdensome time and 
resource commitment, insufficient rewards for reporting, and physicians relying 
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on other health care team members—particularly clinical laboratories 
conducting disease testing—to make the required reports.184 
Some of these reasons seem pretextual. For example, complaints about 
breaching confidentiality are likely overstated as public health officers have 
historically treated physician case reports as strictly confidential.185 Further, the 
federal medical privacy law, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), 186  has a broad public health exception that 
permits provider reporting of infectious disease incidents to public health 
agencies.187 
Other reasons seem evasive. Physicians’ inclination to delegate reporting 
responsibilities to clinical laboratories, for example, neglects the importance of 
physician involvement. Many disease-reporting statutes apply broadly to 
include instances of suspected disease incidents, not just confirmed cases 
resulting from laboratory tests.188 Physicians’ clinical impressions matter greatly 
when classifying an individual as a suspected case. Further, certain diseases and 
syndromes like pediatric influenza deaths do not have confirmatory laboratory 
tests available at all, so effective public health surveillance depends largely on 
physicians’ clinical judgment to identify these incidents.189 
The varied reasons offered for physician noncompliance obscure a more 
fundamental problem: many physicians perceive their core professional 
obligations as largely distinct from basic public health practices. Indeed, public 
health practitioners and private physicians view disease reporting through very 
different perspectives. Public health practitioners envision effective disease 
reporting as instrumental for necessary surveillance. They consider 
participation in disease reporting as part of each provider’s shared 
accountability for the health of the populace. But private physicians have been 
far more wary of disease reporting, in particular how it may intrude upon 
individual treatment relationships: “Public health professionals see their first 
duty as protecting the population, and they justify reporting by invoking 
science and the ethics of collective responsibility. Private physicians, on the 
other hand, see their first duty as safeguarding patients; they accord a higher 
priority to the sanctity of their therapeutic relationships.”190 
A public health-surveillance system can only be as good as the information 
inputted. The long-standing problem of physician noncompliance with disease-
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reporting laws, resulting in part from privileging relationships with patients and 
physician indifference to weak statutory reporting duties, dangerously elevates 
health risks for the community. 
D. The Opioid Epidemic 
The alarming rates of opioid abuse and overdoses present a severe public 
health threat. Many root causes have been identified, including aggressive 
marketing and financial incentives offered to prescribers by pharmaceutical 
companies; flawed reimbursement programs that encourage prescribing-based 
interventions to manage chronic pain compared to safer behavioral alternatives; 
accreditations standards for health care institutions that stressed pain 
management obligations; a fragmented health care system that fails to track 
patients’ prescriptions from a holistic perspective; and inadequate training of 
physicians in recognizing and treating addiction.191 Because the opioid crisis 
involves many actors and moving parts, it defies easy narratives of 
accountability and blame. 
But while many complex factors are in play, lurking less visibly beneath 
the surface is a familiar pattern: physicians’ underweighting of the public health 
implications of their treatment decisions. Certain physicians are easy targets for 
disapproval. Physicians who prescribed large amounts of opioids, egregiously 
breaching standards of care,192 as well as physicians who engaged in “pill mill” 
schemes to exchange prescriptions for cash, 193  certainly contributed to the 
current opioid crisis. But a fair number of physicians engaged in problematic 
opioid prescribing for less nefarious reasons. Many community physicians were 
swept up into, and exacerbated the opioid epidemic because of, their blinkered 
devotion to their individual patients. 
First, physicians prescribed opioids in patterns and amounts that 
foreseeably permitted diversion of the medications to non-patients, fueling 
negative downstream effects and potential black-market dangers for the 
community. As Dr. Anna Lembke describes in The New England Journal of 
Medicine, one puzzle of the opioid crisis is that “[i]n many instances, doctors are 
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fully aware that their patients are abusing these medications or diverting them 
to others for nonmedical use, but they prescribe them anyway.”194 In fact, the 
common tendency for physicians was to prescribe thirty to ninety opioid pills 
per prescription even though much smaller amounts would have been medically 
indicated and “[i]t is the leftover pills that sit forgotten in the medicine cabinet 
which often lead to trouble, stolen by a relative or visitor and abused.” 195 
Physicians could rationalize such excessive prescribing for patient convenience, 
avoiding patient hassle in pursuing multiple refills. Further, physicians most 
interested in securing their patients’ satisfaction above all else could be tempted 
to “just sign another prescription” for a patient rather than take on the more 
difficult task of confronting patients with suspected abuse problems or 
gatekeeping access to opioids.196 
It is worth repeating that a fair number of physicians contributed to the 
opioid crisis inadvertently, but precisely because they focused so much on 
patient welfare. Following the newer professional guidance to take pain 
seriously, these physicians desired to be “good” doctors in providing relief for 
their patients. 197 The imperative “we don’t want our patients to experience 
pain” commanded so much physician attention that it obscured the negative 
downstream public health effects of long-term opioid prescribing.198 Believing 
their first priority was to their patients, and that “all suffering is avoidable,” 
these well-meaning physicians allowed “the patient’s subjective experience of 
pain . . . [to] take[] precedence over other, potentially competing, 
considerations.” 199 Competing considerations that were sublimated certainly 
include community health risks from widespread, chronic use of opioids, such 
as increased rates of addiction and blood-borne, bacterial, and sexually 
transmitted infections.200 
Illustrating the elusivity problem regarding physicians’ public health 
duties, some scholars writing about the opioid crisis have aggressively advanced 
a message of patient primacy that bafflingly eclipses community health 
concerns. Worried about denying patients’ access to needed pain relief, these 
scholars argue that in prescribing opioids, “harm to society should weigh little, if 
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at all, in the treating physician’s assessment.”201 Such commentary reinforces 
the notion that physicians’ duties are solely patient directed, while glossing over 
their public health responsibilities. 
To be clear, this is not a general critique of the medical movement to treat 
pain seriously. In earlier eras, physicians were rightly criticized for being 
unconcerned with patient discomfort and for viewing pain relief as “nobody’s 
job.”202 And physicians otherwise inclined to treat pain seriously were wary of 
prescribing opioids because of fear of regulatory scrutiny and professional 
disciplinary action for ordering controlled substances.203 Instead, this is just 
recognition that however welcome the new push to relieve patient suffering, it 
also raised countervailing implications for public health. Rather than delicately 
balancing these community concerns against patient need, individual clinicians 
seem to have given short shrift to public health. 
Particularly revealing is how physicians have reacted to prescription drug 
monitoring programs (“PDMPs”). PDMPs, electronic databases that track 
prescriptions of certain medications and often require physician query before 
prescribing, have been implemented by law in many states as a means to combat 
the opioid epidemic.204 Yet this form of public health regulation has engendered 
physician resistance.205 Part of the opposition stems from concerns that PDMPs 
limit physician autonomy, expose physicians to greater liability, and may open 
the door to displacing professional self-regulation with greater state control of 
medical practice. Debates about PDMPs, however, invariably include claims 
that this form of regulation interferes with the doctor-patient relationship. 
Under this view, PDMPs impede physicians’ ability to provide individually 
tailored care by limiting treatment choices.206 This illustrates why the patient-
primacy directive exerts such strength and attraction for physicians compared 
to public health obligations. Patient welfare becomes deeply intertwined with, 
and may even provide appealing cover for, underlying anxieties about physician 
autonomy. In making claims about putting patients first and protecting the 
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doctor-patient relationship from outside interference, physicians can resist laws 
that do not defer to their wide exercise of professional authority and judgment.  
Further, public health laws may be more readily discounted by physicians 
because of their seeming inapplicability to patient circumstances. Many public 
health regulatory interventions, like PDMPs, address population-wide effects 
and therefore rely on uniform, standardized approaches. Physicians tend to be 
indifferent to or even suspicious of this form of regulation because they remain 
focused on individual patient health and “[a]pparent solutions of general 
applicability may result in individual cases of suboptimal medical care.”207 
While public health concerns in the initial stages of the opioid epidemic 
were largely about overprescribing, now there is danger of the pendulum 
swinging back yet again. Some physicians are creating new public health 
problems because of insufficient opioid prescribing. Because of increased scrutiny 
arising from the opioid crisis, these physicians have dramatically cut down on 
their use of opioids. Yet they are not necessarily providing adequate alternative 
pain-relief interventions for their chronic pain patients, while other physicians 
have abruptly stopped treating any patients suspected of abusing opioids.208 
This imperils not only the health of patients who may be going through 
withdrawal, but also the health of the community because of the downstream 
effects of such drastic limitations of care, including increased risk of infectious 
disease and other health-harming behavior. This is because “[l]eft to their own 
devices, many of these individuals begin using heroin or illegally obtained 
synthetic opioids, become infected with hepatis B or C or HIV, or suffer the 
catastrophic effects of an overdose.”209 
Physicians who engage in insufficient prescribing are not exactly 
prioritizing their patients’ needs, so in this context it is not yet again the patient-
primacy directive exerting dominance. But neither are these physicians 
optimally protecting the health of the community. It seems that private 
physicians’ public health duties and internalization of a public health-oriented 
mission are so elusive and ephemeral that even when consciously turning away 
from the end goal of relieving suffering of individual patients, these physicians 
remain largely inattentive to the full impact of their treatment-withdrawal 
decisions on public health. 
E. Gun Violence 
The alarmingly high number of individuals killed or injured each year as 
the result of firearms has led public health officials to identify gun violence as 
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a public health crisis.210 Advocates believe a public health approach is warranted 
not only because of the aggregate numbers of death and injuries, but also 
because epidemiological analysis suggests gun violence may share features with 
communicable diseases; exposure to gun violence can predict other incidents, 
and gun violence often diffuses like a contagion through connected social 
networks.211 Physicians also are being asked to step up. Various medical groups 
including the AMA and the American Academy of Pediatrics have issued policy 
statements calling for greater physician involvement in combating gun 
violence.212 
Physician engagement can take various forms. For example, physicians can 
counsel patients about the risks of guns in the home and recommend safe storage 
practices. Although there is a dearth of well-designed studies, research suggests 
physician counseling in this manner may mitigate injury risk.213 Physicians can 
also conduct screenings and implement interventions for risk of suicide, given 
the high correlation between gun ownership and deaths involving suicide.214 
Physician screening and intervention can also reduce harms for additional high-
risk populations when guns are in the home, including children, patients with 
dementia, patients experiencing alcohol abuse, and domestic violence victims.215 
Although well positioned to address gun injury, physicians “ask 
infrequently about firearms and counsel poorly, if at all, although they are aware 
that the high lethality of firearms makes prevention efforts particularly 
important.” 216  A number of barriers have been identified. Some physicians 
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report uncertainty about how to communicate with patients about guns and 
concerns that interventions will be ineffective.217 Also, apprehension of legal 
liability has taken on outsized importance. Florida enacted a highly publicized 
“gag” law that sought to restrict physicians’ ability to ask patients about the 
presence of guns in their homes and to document this information in medical 
records. 218  Physicians nationwide, following coverage of the Florida 
controversy, likely perceived that laws prevented them from talking to their 
patients about gun ownership and risk of injury. 
Yet legal restrictions cannot fully explain the significant physician 
hesitancy. First, perceptions about significant legal impediments are likely 
mistaken. After lengthy litigation, and multiple appeals, the Eleventh Circuit 
held that major provisions of the Florida statute violated the First Amendment 
rights of physicians and struck down key provisions of the law.219 Also, the 
highly publicized gag law, even before being struck down, only applied in 
Florida, and posed no restrictions to physicians in other states. Moreover, even 
in Florida, physicians were rarely asking patients about guns before the 
enactment of the gag law, so the concerns with legal liability seem somewhat of 
a red herring.220 
Clearly patient primacy is also a significant part of the picture. Some 
physicians report hesitancy to discuss guns with patients because they worry 
that such inquiries damage the doctor-patient relationship.221 Other physicians 
indicate concern that such discussions may infringe on their patients’ privacy.222 
Such heightened concern for patient sensitivity and privacy seems oddly 
misplaced however. As noted, no law generally restricts physicians from asking 
about gun ownership and the information once gathered would be subject to 
usual doctor-patient confidentiality restrictions. In addition, patients are not 
compelled to answer the physician’s questions. More importantly, physicians 
routinely ask patients about quite personal and sensitive information, including 
drug and alcohol use, sexual activity, and mental health.223 
In addition, some physicians perceive combatting gun violence as beyond 
their professional scope of practice, further illustrating the elusiveness of their 
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public health obligations.224 As gun ownership is a highly charged issue in the 
United States, both culturally and politically, it should not surprise that without 
clearer guidance about their professional role, physicians would opt to avoid the 
issue of gun-violence prevention altogether. The National Rifle Association 
(“NRA”) has also been very adept in pushing the “scope of practice” angle. The 
NRA has publicly warned physicians to “stay in their lane.”225 The rationale 
apparently is that gun violence is not sufficiently connected to actual medical 
care and is therefore inappropriate for physician involvement.226 
It is unclear why gun-violence prevention should seem so disconnected 
from responsible physician engagement. Physicians have direct expertise with 
the medical care needs that result from gun violence. They are also well 
positioned to identify and screen for high-risk populations, such as patients with 
dementia or suicidal ideation.227 Moreover, physicians have not always limited 
themselves to treating existing illness. They have long adopted counseling and 
safety-education roles regarding external threats, conditions, and behaviors that 
can be potentially health harming. For example, pediatricians routinely inquire 
about use of car seats for their young patients 228 and physicians screen for 
possible exposure to lead poisoning from paint and other sources in the home.229 
Gun-violence prevention, therefore, seems equally within physicians’ scope of 
practice. Yet uneasiness about taking on uncertain public health obligations, 
along with the default privileging of patient interests over community health 
protection, have contributed to physician hesitancy. 
IV.  RECALIBRATING PHYSICIANS’ PUBLIC HEALTH DUTIES 
Identifying the problematic risk externalization associated with 
physicians’ elusive public health duties does not answer what to do about it. A 
legal shift in physicians’ duties raises difficult challenges, both pragmatic and 
doctrinal. This part evaluates the potential obstacles to making physicians’ 
public health duties more robust and cognizable under law. To address the 
insufficient theorization underlying physicians’ community health obligations, 
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this part also explores various justifications for recalibrating physicians’ public 
health duties including, most importantly, role indispensability. 
A. Challenges in Making Public Health Duties More Robust 
Strengthening physicians’ public health duties raises many potential 
difficulties, including unlimited liability, common law’s traditional reluctance 
to impose affirmative duties on nonfeasant parties, and the undermining of 
physicians’ fiduciary obligations. 
1.  Too Many Plaintiffs/Liability Without Limits 
If law imposes stronger public health responsibilities, does this mean that 
each physician owes to every member of the public an actionable duty to 
safeguard community health? This shift might counterproductively move from 
limited accountability to an even worse state of overdeterrence. Rather than 
optimally incentivizing private physicians to take public health action, the 
heightened liability exposure could lead to distorted decision-making and severe 
limitations in the supply of physician services. 
This concern with obligations to too many plaintiffs runs through the 
infectious disease case law. Courts have been very reluctant to extend 
physicians’ duties to foreseeable third parties harmed by their patients’ 
infectious diseases. The fear is that once the physician’s duty extends beyond 
the doctor-patient relationship, no principled method exists for demarcating 
where the physician’s duty ends. For example, in McNulty v. City of New York,230 
physicians treated a patient with infectious meningitis. A friend of the patient 
also contracted the disease. The friend alleged that the physicians breached a 
duty in failing to advise that she might need treatment after being in close 
contact with the patient. 231  The court held that the physicians owed no 
actionable duty to the friend. As the court observed, “[U]nderlying this 
reluctance [to extend duty to non-patients] is the danger that a recognition of a 
duty would render doctors liable to a prohibitive number of possible 
plaintiffs.” 232  While acknowledging that it might be wise public policy for 
physicians to advise non-patients of their health risks from possible exposure, 
the court concluded that enlarging physicians’ duties this broadly would go 
against the strong principle of “limit[ing] the legal consequences of wrongs to a 
controllable degree.”233 
While a challenge, the “too many plaintiffs” problem is not necessarily 
insurmountable. In other contexts, courts have deployed various doctrinal rules, 
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such as privity, to fix the “orbit of duty . . . to protect against crushing exposure 
to liability.”234 Courts in public health disputes likewise could use line-drawing 
rules. For example, a physician’s public health duties could be held to run only 
to particularly foreseeable parties connected to either the physician or patient 
in a manner that goes beyond mere exposure to the risk emanating from the 
doctor-patient relationship. These connections could be close familial, social, or 
business relationships with either the physician or patient. Geographic 
proximity with the physician or patient could also be considered as a duty-
defining factor, which would serve as a proxy for local community ties. Thus, 
the physician might owe a duty to the patient’s close family, friends, coworkers, 
and immediate neighbors, but not necessarily to other foreseeable third parties, 
such as copatrons of the same retail establishments, who end up exposed to the 
patient’s health risk. Such distinctions admittedly run the risk of arbitrariness, 
but no more so than other line drawing courts have regularly engaged in to set 
limits on otherwise unbounded duty.235 
If such line drawing does become too arbitrary, or fails to limit physicians’ 
liability exposure to feasible levels, courts and/or legislators could instead 
establish that the physician’s breach of public health duties is not actionable by 
individual community members, but only by intermediaries and proxies for the 
public, such as state attorneys general or state medical boards.236 Under this 
approach, while physicians would be recognized as having more robust legal 
duties to protect community health, breaches of such duties would be enforced 
in the public’s interest only by such appropriate intermediaries, who would be 
expected to act as prudent representatives and remain sensitive to 
overburdening ordinary physicians with inordinate liability exposure. 
Moreover, undue liability exposure associated with more robust public 
health obligations may be overstated. At least for common-law claims, 
individual members of the public bringing actions as plaintiffs would still have 
the burdens of proof and persuasion concerning causation. For many public 
health hazards, such as incidents of gun violence or infectious disease outbreak, 
it becomes daunting to prove causation with a clear enough nexus between the 
physician’s conduct and the public health risks that injure the individual third 
party. Inevitable causation complications arise, including the ways the risk 
emanating from the doctor-patient relationship intermingle with other risks in 
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the population; identification problems concerning which causal factors were 
root causes; the numerous community members involved; potentially long 
exposure and latency periods; and the many intervening casual factors that 
might be considered superseding causes, such as contacts with other individuals 
and health-harming actions by the potential plaintiffs.237 
Analogous causation hurdles can be seen in related debates on whether 
persons who contract infectious disease can recover from members in the 
community who choose to go unvaccinated. Commentators note that significant 
factual and proximate causation problems may frustrate vindication of such 
claims. Plaintiffs may not be able to satisfy traditional civil standards of proof 
when identifying which unvaccinated person in the community actually 
infected them because other unvaccinated persons and additional sources of 
causation remain highly plausible in many situations of community 
transmission.238 Health authorities might have good evidence concerning the 
suspect “index case” who likely served as the triggering event for initial 
community transmission and a local outbreak. 239  But even then, difficult 
questions arise whether the index patient can be considered the proximate cause 
of secondary and tertiary infections because of intervening steps, actions of 
other infected parties, and geographic and temporal remoteness.240 
2.  Common Law Reluctance To Impose Affirmative Duties 
At least as a matter of common law, more robust recognition of physicians’ 
public health duties seemingly represents a radical shift in doctrine. In relation 
to non-patients, physicians are arguably in the same position as ordinary 
individuals and, as such, they generally have no duty unless they are risk 
creating or misfeasant. 241 This distinction between risk emanating from the 
physician’s own treatment plan (more likely leading to duty because of 
misfeasance) 242  versus risk already occurring with the patient (harder duty 
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question because of nonfeasance) becomes significant when thinking about the 
full scope of physicians’ public health duties. In many public health contexts, 
such as disease reporting or gun violence, the physician might be seen as 
nonfeasant in failing to prevent harm already emanating from the patient, rather 
than generating additional risk as part of the treatment provided. 
Doctrinally, therefore, broad public health duties for physicians seemingly 
run counter to the common-law tradition. This is a tradition that emphasizes 
autonomy and allowing persons to choose to be instruments of good, rather than 
having them answer to compelled societal obligations. This also reflects the 
law’s preference for limited governmental intrusion into private affairs and a 
negative state.243 Public health’s more communitarian orientation, in contrast, 
considers the populace’s baseline health as a necessary predicate to individual 
exercise of autonomy. The public health perspective emphasizes the 
interconnectedness of community members and each individual’s obligation to 
account for the health needs of the population. 
Common-law duty has been imposed in particular instances of 
nonfeasance, such as Tarasoff situations when a doctor has a special relationship 
with a patient whose mental health condition poses a specific risk of violence to 
others.244 But courts have recognized such affirmative duties on an incremental 
basis and as exceptions to the ordinary no-duty rule. This is because “the 
longstanding general duty/no-duty framework is an engrained one, solicitations 
for new affirmative duties represent exceptions which require concrete and 
substantial justification.” 245  Moreover, there is judicial sensitivity to 
institutional competence. Legislatures and regulatory bodies may be better 
equipped than courts to consider the social and policy consequences of 
broadening duty rules and the full range of interests at stake beyond those of 
the immediate litigants.246 
These considerations have significant merit and reveal the formidable 
doctrinal challenges in enlarging the scope of physicians’ common-law public 
health duties. But they do not completely preclude such a shift. First, significant 
harms may be avoided if courts recognize stronger public health duties by 
physicians. With public health duties underpowered at present, insidious 
externalization of health risks from patients to the community occurs 
unabated.247 Extensive fact finding and prudent inquiry will hopefully account 
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for these largely unexamined costs associated with the patient-primacy directive 
inevitably overriding public health concerns. 
Second, as a doctrinal matter, the distinction between misfeasance and 
nonfeasance is often misleading. Conduct characterized as one can readily be 
reinterpreted as the other. 248 In addition, courts have expanded the special 
relationship exceptions to the nonfeasance, no-duty rule in ways that make it 
unclear why certain relationships—such as employer-employee and business-
public invitee—fit into the exception but not others.249 Therefore, it may be 
better that the duty question not turn rigidly on characterizing a particular 
physician’s conduct as misfeasance or nonfeasance, or whether the physician had 
a “special relationship.” Instead, the duty question should more openly consider 
the underlying policy considerations for imposing legal responsibility. In many 
public health situations, as explained further below, physicians are in the best 
position to address the community health risk, equivalent to the cheapest-cost 
avoider.250 Common-law courts have relied on such instrumental rationales as 
which party can best control risk for imposing duty in other contexts.251 With 
physicians in particular, there are strong policy reasons to treat them, even 
outside the doctor-patient relationship, as different from ordinary individuals. 
Their actions and inactions with regard to public health risks have more 
significant, wide-ranging consequences for the community because of their role 
indispensability to safeguarding the health of the populace.252 Although not an 
entirely satisfactory answer to the doctrinal concerns of expanding physicians’ 
common-law public health duties, courts might ultimately justify such a move 
as a form of “‘benign commandeering’ . . . [where] we impose special altruistic 
responsibilities on [particular defendant classes such as] health care 
professionals and places of public accommodation” for overall general 
welfare.253 
 
 248. See, e.g., John. M. Adler, Relying upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About 
the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties To Aid or Protect Others, 1991 WISC. L. REV. 867, 
878. 
 249. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 40 cmt. 
h (AM. L. INST. 2012) (“The term ‘special relationship’ has no independent significance. It merely 
signifies that courts recognize an affirmative duty arising out of the relationship where otherwise no 
duty would exist . . . .”). 
 250. See infra Section IV.B. 
 251. See, e.g., Dalury v. S–K–I, Ltd., 670 A.2d. 795, 799 (Vt. 1995) (holding that premises liability 
imposes duty on those who own or control the land because they have “the expertise and opportunity 
to foresee and control hazards” arising from use of the premises). 
 252. See infra Section IV.B.1. 
 253. Kenneth S. Abraham & Leslie Kendrick, There’s No Such Thing as Affirmative Duty, 104 IOWA 
L. REV. 1649, 1692 (2019). 
99 N.C. L. REV. 923 (2021) 
2021] PHYSICIANS' ELUSIVE PUBLIC HEALTH DUTIES 971 
3.  Fiduciary Duty Constraints 
Recalibrating physicians’ public health duties also runs the risk of 
eviscerating their fiduciary obligations to patients. As previously noted, to the 
extent the doctor-patient relationship has fiduciary characteristics, physicians’ 
fiduciary responsibilities generally direct them to maximize patient welfare, not 
to disadvantage patients in favor of the health of the community.254 However, 
fiduciary duty constraints are not necessarily so restrictive. Under more flexible 
interpretations of fiduciary law, a pathway exists for accommodating more 
vigorous physician engagement in public health. 
Fiduciary duty law likely does not alter the actual standard of care 
physicians owe their patients, it may just require more elevated disclosure 
through the informed consent doctrine. 255  The standard of care is usually 
determined by medical custom and what reasonable physicians in the relevant 
peer community ordinarily do. Thus, to the extent physicians more frequently 
account for the public’s health in their treatment interactions with patients, and 
inform patients of their public health reasons, the physician-fiduciary’s duty of 
care is more easily satisfied. This would be the case even when a physician acts 
as a gatekeeper to a critical resource or takes on other public health 
responsibilities that do not singularly advance patient welfare. 
Of course, the most troubling potential legal barrier is not the fiduciary 
duty of care but the fiduciary duty of loyalty. How to square physicians favoring 
community health with loyalty to the patient? Despite the strong rhetoric 
surrounding the fiduciary’s duty of loyalty, absolute fidelity to the beneficiary 
is not always required as courts occasionally modify the trust-based rules when 
the maximalist position is at odds with policy and societal concerns.256 
Fiduciary law in the health care context has likewise been applied flexibly 
to allow for financial incentives directed at physicians that otherwise might 
present duty of loyalty concerns because the incentives help advance other 
societal imperatives, such as controlling ever-escalating health care costs. 257 
Further, courts have been reluctant to recognize broad causes of action against 
physicians for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty due to conflicting financial 
interests.258 If fiduciary law can tolerate use of potentially conflicting financial 
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incentives to engage physicians in important social objectives like controlling 
health care costs, it would likewise seem able to accommodate physician 
engagement in essential activities like public health protection. 
Further, the question of the physician’s fiduciary duty of loyalty becomes 
more complex when one recognizes that the typical physician has multiple 
patients. Some actions taken by a physician to protect community health, such 
as limiting antibiotic prescriptions, may disfavor the one patient denied access 
while helping the physician’s other patients as members of the community who 
benefit from reduced risk of antibiotic resistance. By analogy, fiduciary doctrine 
in other contexts such as trust law recognizes that because the trustee has a duty 
to multiple beneficiaries, there is latitude for deploying trust assets in unequal 
shares to account for differing needs and priorities among the group as a 
whole.259 As such, the physician embracing more robust public health actions 
that may favor certain patients over others can often credibly argue that she is 
trying to discharge loyalty obligations to multiple patients. 
Moreover, a physician can also credibly argue that in discharging her duty 
of loyalty to a patient, she should have flexibility to account for both the 
patient’s current and future health needs. Actions that disfavor a current patient 
may in some instances actually advantage the same patient in the future. 
Returning to antibiotic conservation, for example, physician gatekeeping that 
limits antibiotic use of only marginal benefit to a patient helps preserve the 
medication’s effectiveness generally. Thus, if the same patient has more 
compelling need for the same drug in a future health care episode, the antibiotic 
is then more likely to offer benefit. 
B. Possible Justifications for Stronger Public Health Duties 
Notwithstanding the inherent challenges in strengthening physicians’ 
public health duties, countervailing justifications support such a move. These 
considerations include physicians’ role indispensability, the expertise they can 
apply in discharging such duties, social contract theory, validating social 
expectations, and ensuring equitable distribution of physician burden in 
combatting public health threats. 
1.  Role Indispensability 
Perhaps the strongest justification for law to impose enhanced public 
health duties on physicians is role indispensability. The argument is not that 
physicians are particularly suited for the role of public health stewards. But, 
pragmatically, they are still likely better than the alternatives. Simply put, the 
public health system cannot effectively operate without broad, engaged 
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participation of private physicians. The traditional medicine/public health 
divide typically overlooks private physicians as part of the public health space. 
However, as the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed, traditional public health 
personnel such as contact tracers and epidemiologists are quite limited in 
number and work for state and local health departments that have been 
consistently underfunded and understaffed.260 To a surprising degree, “[t]he 
rest of the [public health] response is in the hands of thousands of private 
militias — hospitals, insurers, doctors, nurses, respiratory technicians, 
pharmacists and so on . . . .”261 
Physicians work at the critical nerve center of this private/public response 
force. Their uniquely advantageous position—strategically embedded between 
their patient, other patients, and society—makes private physicians’ 
engagement critical for effective public health protection. First, physicians 
perform a sentinel function. As frontline practitioners, they are often patients’ 
first contact with the delivery system. They have the initial opportunity to 
interact with individuals and identify illnesses and concerning patterns, such as 
antibiotic-resistant infections, opioid abuse, or novel viral cases, that suggest 
larger threats to community health. Community physicians become “privy to 
social trends long before those trends become epidemics in our communities[, 
and w]hen they observe patient after patient with the same diagnosis, they’re 
the first to see the patterns.”262 Private physicians have been recognized as 
“critical partners in monitoring community health” because, in their patient 
interactions in the clinical trenches, they regularly “encounter diseases, 
conditions, and injuries that may be important not only for an individual patient 
but also for the community as a whole.”263 
Physicians may not only be the first to observe and identify warning signs 
of community health threats, but they also are usually in the best position to act 
on the information when limited time windows exist. For example, as 
mandatory reporters of infectious disease cases to public health authorities, 
community physicians are arguably more important responders than clinical 
laboratories and other secondary providers who also have statutory reporting 
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obligations. Physicians can make quick professional judgments based on clinical 
examination of patients, whereas other providers may need more testing time 
and “a reporting delay . . . to providers waiting for laboratory-confirmation 
could have a substantial public health impact by permitting further spread of a 
highly communicable disease.”264 
Second, community physicians perform the key role as gatekeeper. As 
agents of their patients with superior knowledge and discretionary authority to 
order care and make referrals, community physicians are in a position to 
monitor, influence, and even induce demand for health care products and 
services. Health policy analysts advise that there is no more powerful lever in 
the health care market than the “physician’s pen” because physicians’ 
discretionary orders265 and prescriptions account for seventy to ninety percent 
of all health care costs.266 
Gatekeeping has most often been associated with cost control. The ideal 
gatekeeper physician balances particular patient needs and potential benefits of 
interventions with the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of care, sometimes 
limiting care plans in order to conserve resources for other patients.267 But there 
is a clear connection between gatekeeping and public health. For example, in 
the case of antibiotic resistance, physician gatekeeping is critical. By limiting 
antibiotic orders for only high-value uses and engaging in other conservation 
strategies, physicians can minimize community health threats, such as resistant 
bacteria and ineffective medications. 268  Likewise, the negative downstream 
effects for the populace of indiscriminate opioid prescribing can be understood 
as physicians performing poorly as gatekeepers to powerfully addictive 
medications.269 In short, physicians’ gatekeeping function makes them uniquely 
positioned to direct the use of limited societal resources for safeguarding the 
health of the community. 
Third, physicians perform key roles as learned intermediaries, distilling 
and shaping complex medical information for their patients’ particular 
situations and needs. Informed consent law envisions a counseling role for the 
physician in educating the patient about a proposed treatment’s material risks 
 
 264. Fill et al., supra note 179, at 585. 
 265. William M. Sage, Fracking Health Care: How To Safely De-Medicalize America and Recover 
Trapped Value for Its People, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 635, 642 & n.22 (2017). 
 266. Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost 
Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 434 (1988). 
 267. See generally Hall, supra note 255 (arguing for lifting the ethical taboo against physician bedside 
rationing); Jessica Mantel, A Defense of Physicians’ Gatekeeping Role: Balancing Patients’ Needs with Society’s 
Interests, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 633 (2015) (arguing that physicians have a duty of care both to individual 
patients and society at large, and that health care rationing is called for to balance these two duties). 
 268. See supra Section III.B. 
 269. See supra Section III.D. 
99 N.C. L. REV. 923 (2021) 
2021] PHYSICIANS' ELUSIVE PUBLIC HEALTH DUTIES 975 
and benefits and the medically viable alternatives.270 Physicians frequently have 
to explain not only the risks and benefits of proposed treatments, but also more 
basic diagnostic details about what is medically occurring with the patient and 
how the patient’s body may be responding. In this respect, a fair share of health 
care might be considered “credence” goods and services, rather than more 
common “experience” or “search” goods and services in the marketplace. 271 
Rather than form impressions largely based on her own experiences with 
treatment, a patient depends on the physician, as learned intermediary, to 
explain what has been working or not. Further, the learned intermediary 
doctrine under products liability law recognizes that pharmaceutical suppliers 
can discharge their duty to warn about medication risks by alerting prescribing 
physicians through drug label inserts, “Dear Doctor” letters, and otherwise, 
rather than directly warning the end-user patients. 272 Physicians are legally 
expected to, in turn, discuss some, but not all, of this information with their 
patients. Physicians mediate the risk information exchange, using their expert 
medical knowledge and understanding of the patient’s situation to provide 
information about the drug and its risks that is tailored to the patient’s 
condition.273 
As learned intermediaries, physicians can also engage in significant public 
health protection. They can call attention to public health implications that 
their patients may not otherwise understand or heed. For example, a physician 
who does not consider public health obligations could simply inform a patient 
that prescribing an antibiotic for a viral infection will be ineffective and offer 
the patient no curative effects. But if the physician were attentive to her public 
health role, she could lean into her learned intermediary status and further 
counsel that prescribing in these situations endangers community health 
because of increasing selection pressures for resistant bacteria in the 
community. 
Physicians are successful learned intermediaries not only because they 
have expertise but because they command significant public trust.274 As such, 
they can be very effective public health counselors when interacting with their 
patients and members of the community. Of course, trust in health care is 
somewhat fragile and can be easily squandered.275 It is possible that a legal shift 
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requiring stronger physician duties for public health protection could erode 
patient trust if patients perceive their physicians are no longer as devoted to 
individual patient welfare. However, powerful intrinsic reasons for patients to 
have confidence in their physicians exist, even in the face of legal regulation 
that seemingly threatens trust in the doctor-patient relationship.276 
2.  Expertise 
Related to their role indispensability, physicians have a particular 
expertise to apply in addressing public health threats. Difficulty of discharging 
a legal duty and extent of the burden it imposes on a potential class of 
defendants are usually critical policy considerations in determining whether to 
impose affirmative legal duties.277 Community physicians’ relevant expertise 
makes it more likely that they can feasibly discharge stronger public health 
responsibilities. 
To start, physicians have a comprehensive understanding of medical 
processes to evaluate how public health risks interact with biologic systems and 
human physiology.278 In wide-ranging public health matters such as smoking, 
using motorcycle helmets, and wearing masks, physicians can also directly relate 
the health experiences of their own patients to the health threats of the 
community.279 In addition, physicians have special capabilities because of their 
training in differential diagnosis and iterative, flexible diagnostic processes. For 
example, physicians’ clinical judgment and diagnostic skills are needed for 
public health surveillance to identify certain threatening diseases and 
syndromes, like fungal meningitis and pediatric influenza, that do not have 
confirmatory laboratory tests available.280 Even for diseases and syndromes that 
can be confirmed through lab tests, physicians may have access to other 
important information by handling specimens and identifying unusual 
symptom indications and other relevant clinical evidence. Skilled interviews 
with patients and expert diagnostic skills enable physicians to recognize 
“clusters of illness as well as urgent, suspected diseases.”281 
Admittedly, there are increasingly expansive demands on physicians to 
address all sorts of societal problems, especially with the new interest in social 
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determinants of health. 282  Thus, some advocates urge physicians to write 
prescriptions for food and housing,283 to promote affordable health care,284 to 
fight climate change, 285 and otherwise to tackle larger socioeconomic issues 
affecting the health of their patients and the population. At some point, one 
must question whether physicians really have sufficient expertise to address so 
many wide-ranging social problems, many of which seem several levels removed 
from ordinary decision-making in the clinic. 
However, with many of the public health risks contemplated in this 
Article, a clearer connection exists between the community harms at issue and 
physician expertise. Risks such as antibiotic-resistant infections, as well as 
indications of dementia or suicidal ideation among gun owners, are 
fundamentally clinical health risks in origin. These are hazards where 
community physicians’ specialized skills and abilities in clinical diagnosis and 
health communication more likely matter and have real impact. As such, their 
highly relevant expertise cuts in favor of amplifying physicians’ public health 
duties. 
3.  Social Contract 
Social contract theory envisions citizens consenting to give power to the 
state as part of an assumed, theorized bargain.286 Citizens will receive certain 
benefits from the state, such as protection of their liberty and property. In 
return, citizens owe society something back and, some commentators contend, 
this can extend to helping others avoid harm, especially if the state cannot do 
so alone.287 As the state cannot safeguard community health alone, and because 
private physicians are indispensable to an effective public health system, social 
contract theory supports stronger affirmative obligations on physicians to 
protect public health. 
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Further, social contract perspectives view physicians as more than just 
ordinary citizens in terms of what they may owe back to the state as part of an 
assumed, theorized bargain. In addition to the basic benefits every citizen 
enjoys from the state, physicians receive additional advantages and privileges. 
They are granted a special license to provide professional services. They also 
receive expensive medical education and graduate medical training that the 
government significantly subsidizes.288 In addition, physicians enjoy high social 
status and the perks of membership in an elite, guild-like profession that 
commands much deference from society, including in setting standards of care, 
disciplining professional members, and determining which services even require 
medical licensure.289 In return for these particular benefits, physicians arguably 
have obligations to “provide care when needed by the public.”290 
However, it is debatable whether social contract theory can be relied upon 
to require broader public health measures of physicians that are outside ordinary 
doctor-patient relationships. For example, some commentators question 
whether social contract obligations justify expectations that physicians work, at 
much personal risk to themselves, during a pandemic.291 To the extent social 
contract theory arguments heavily depend on some quid pro quo for the societal 
benefits physicians enjoy, the difficult question is whether physicians 
understand what their end of the bargain is and thus voluntarily assume broad 
public health responsibilities when entering the medical profession. 292 
Physicians could credibly argue they did not believe they had robust public 
health duties when deciding to practice medicine. Indeed, expansive public 
health obligations are not expressly enumerated in physician licensure laws.293 
Moreover, medical ethics and norms so emphasize the patient-primacy 
directive that physicians could justify regular patient care activities as fulfilling 
their end of any implicit social contract bargain, without needing to provide 
more open-ended public health protection to the community at large. Indeed, 
the way physicians pay back the state for their societal benefits can take many 
forms, including sharing knowledge gained from medical research, volunteering 
for some uncompensated care, training the next generation of physicians, and 
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participating in prudent administration of the health care delivery system. Also, 
to the extent subsidized medical education is the primary societal benefit many 
physicians enjoy, this is an economic benefit, and arguably physicians’ quid pro 
quo obligation in return could also be limited to items of economic value, not 
necessarily working to safeguard the public’s health. 294  Accordingly, if 
physicians really owe something to society, it is not clear that the payback 
encompasses assuming public health duties to any degree. 
4.  Social Expectations 
As legal duties often mirror and reinforce social attitudes, an important 
consideration is whether imposing more vigorous public health duties on 
physicians vindicates or frustrates societal expectations about the medical 
profession. The patient-primacy directive is so well ingrained that individuals 
find considerable comfort from the idea that their physicians put patients first. 
Indeed, both the public and most physicians likely agree on the dynamic of “the 
good doctor who cares for the one patient at any one time, and the patient who 
expects that the best will be done for him or her.”295 Under this view, physicians 
who “prioriti[ze] public health care . . . would devalue the expectation of 
patients.”296 
On the other hand, is patient primacy really all that the public envisions 
for physicians? Social expectations might actually be more nuanced. The public 
does regularly observe community physicians working to safeguard public 
health, with common activities such as vaccination and assessing impaired 
patients’ fitness to drive. And throughout history, the public has observed self-
sacrificing behavior by physicians during public health crisis periods in 
combatting spread of infectious disease. 297  Under this view, “[h]istorically, 
medicine as a learned profession has been understood to have a social 
responsibility to use knowledge and skills to enhance the common good, 
including obligations to protect public health and safety.”298 
Thus, honoring social expectations in shaping physicians’ public health 
duties becomes tricky. The public likely holds somewhat contradictory, even 
unrealistic views about physicians—that clinicians should always do what is best 
for the patient and should vigorously safeguard the health of the community. 
This should not surprise as the public regularly has fickle, inconsistent views 
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when it comes to health care, such as an expectation that the delivery system 
should offer the best care possible but at low cost and unrestricted access. 
Further, from the ex ante perspective, before knowing what their 
particular circumstances will be, most individuals would likely prefer a regime 
where physicians have more robust public health duties that sometimes trump 
patient welfare concerns. Yes, an individual patient may suffer loss if his 
physician at times prioritizes public health over doing the best possible for the 
patient. At the same time, however, that same patient enjoys offsetting benefits 
when other patients’ physicians pay greater heed to their public health roles. In 
other words, if other patients’ physicians are empowered and expected to act more 
readily to protect the health of the populace, the individual patient still benefits 
from the enhanced health protections the community now enjoys. 
Certainly, better explanation to the public about why private physicians at 
times need to act as agents of community health would help adjust social 
expectations going forward. Further, if physicians were also required to notify 
patients in advance about their practice operations and the individual patient 
welfare/public health balance as part of the informed consent process, this 
would also help align social expectations with physicians’ enhanced public 
health responsibilities. Adjustment to patient expectations by advance 
disclosure already occurs in some public health contexts. For example, standard 
HIPAA notifications from health care providers advise patients that otherwise-
confidential patient health information may be shared with public health 
agencies.299 
5.  Equitable Distribution of Physician Burden/Collective Action 
Legal recognition of more robust public health duties for physicians also 
would make application of such duties more visible and uniform, helping 
address concerns of inequitable physician burden. Physicians who directly take 
on public health challenges shoulder a very large responsibility if not supported 
by their professional peers. For example, during pandemics, “it is much more 
feasible for any one physician to assume the risks of providing care . . . when all 
physicians are sharing the risks.” 300  Concerns about inequitable physician 
burdens apply equally well to many other public health problems. Efforts to 
address community health risks such as gun violence and opioid abuse become 
more manageable when the onus is spread more evenly among doctors in the 
clinical trenches. Imposing public health duties more uniformly also helps 
advance physicians’ professional solidarity. As members of the same profession, 
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physicians arguably have some obligation to assist fellow physicians who endure 
significant hardship in addressing public health threats.301 
Further, combating many public health threats necessarily raises collective 
action challenges. The efforts of only some community physicians, however 
vigorous, will not have much effect if other physicians are not on board because 
of the interconnectedness of the health care system’s components and the 
manner in which public health risks propagate. For example, in the case of 
antibiotic resistance, a few physicians’ inappropriate prescribing patterns can 
introduce strong resistance selection pressures in the community that may 
render future uses of medications ineffective, even if other physicians prudently 
conserve antibiotics.302 Similarly, indiscriminate prescribing of opioids by a few 
physicians can have devastating effects for a local community, even if other 
physicians are more mindful of the dangers of opioid access. Addicted patients 
will doctor shop and gravitate towards the few physicians prescribing widely. 
And patients still able to abuse opioids will generate exponentially greater 
health risks for the community through needle sharing and other health-
harming activity. 
Given such enormous collective action challenges, “the survival of the 
community” demands that physician responsibility for public health matters be 
shared broadly.303 Moreover, letting some physicians “off the hook” by not 
recognizing and uniformly applying more robust public health duties invites 
further collective action problems of free riders and insufficient coordination. 
This encourages the view among private physicians that they should “stay in 
their lane,” that all will be fine if they simply take care of their individual 
patients, and that other doctors and public health workers will take care of 
particular public health risks. The problem is that the more disregard of public 
health matters becomes tolerated, the more physicians are likely to neglect their 
public health duties.304 
C. Possible Ways Forward 
The exact formulation of recalibrated public health duties for physicians 
is beyond the intended scope of this Article. Its principal aim has been to call 
attention to the harmful risk externalization occurring when law’s patient-
primacy directive overrides physicians’ elusive public health duties. It also has 
sought to provide deeper theoretical foundations for making physicians’ public 
health duties more cognizable and influential. Nonetheless, this final section 
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concludes by offering some preliminary considerations for moving forward with 
a legal shift in physicians’ obligations. 
First, adjusted expectations are in order regarding how to balance patient 
and public health duties. It is acknowledged that enhancing physicians’ public 
health duties, while still demanding strong obligations to each patient, may lead 
to much variability in practice. Physicians could point to either patient or public 
health as justification for different conduct. However, any adjustment in 
physicians’ legal duties, if it brings more accountability and visibility to public 
health considerations flowing from physician decision-making, would still 
represent an improvement over the status quo where public health seems to be 
consistently given short shrift in favor of patient primacy. Further, many legal 
duties are not capable of being stated with rule-like precision as the duty 
analysis often ends up balancing a number of shifting factors and policy 
considerations. “[D]uty is not sacrosanct in itself . . . but is only an expression 
of the sum total of those considerations of policy [which] lead the law to say 
that the plaintiff is entitled to protection.”305 Thus, it should be expected that 
even with a move towards more robust public health duties for physicians, there 
will still be variability in similar situations of patient-public health tension in 
how forcefully the public health obligations are applied. 
Second, lawmakers and regulators ideally should, through statutes and 
regulations, identify clearer pathways where private physicians can enter the 
public health sphere, move beyond their heavy relational orbit with patients, 
and protect non-patients from health risks. For example, as previously noted, 
some medical practice acts permit physicians to prescribe opioid antagonists, 
such as naloxone, to non-patients to prevent overdoses.306 What is needed are 
more statutory provisions of this type, which clearly embrace a public health 
role for private physicians in taking action for the community, including 
expectations that are binding and not just permissive. Such codification would 
be welcome to counter perceived barriers because of patient primacy. It also 
might have larger impact because of the expressive effect of law in changing 
norms.307 Clearer legal recognition of physicians’ connections to non-patients 
would help shift professional norms about physician engagement in matters of 
public health. 
Third, also critical is stronger enforcement of the minimal public health 
obligations for physicians already existing under law, such as addressing 
physicians’ poor compliance with statutory obligations to report communicable-
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disease cases.308 Importantly, stronger enforcement does not necessarily mean 
severe licensure discipline or increased civil fines. More consistent enforcement 
of the modest sanctions already existing under these laws might prove just as 
effective, especially if other physicians take note of the uptick in actions against 
noncompliant physicians as cautionary tales. Further, higher compliance can 
also be achieved through targeted education, auditing, positive rewards, and 
leveraging physicians’ intrinsic reasons for compliance, not just threat of heavy 
sanction. In this respect, lawmakers might consider adding additional financial 
incentives under governmental health care programs such as Medicare and 
Medicaid for physicians meeting targeted public health goals. This could 
include, for example, bonuses for prescribing antibiotics within recommended 
resistance-control guidelines or engaging in a threshold number of gun-violence 
screenings with patients. It may also be, as previously discussed, that because 
of unbounded liability concerns some public health duties are better enforced 
by prudent intermediaries such as medical boards instead of through private 
actions. 309  However, medical boards will need to really step up their 
enforcement activity. Physician oversight from licensing authorities has been 
traditionally lax in public health matters, but “this largely under-resourced 
system” 310  may ultimately have greater beneficial effect if deployed more 
vigorously. 
Finally, nonmaleficence serves as a helpful guiding principle for thinking 
about the dual-loyalty problem between patient welfare and public health. 
Nonmaleficence, often known as the “duty to do no harm,” is one of the four 
commonly recognized core principles of bioethics along with beneficence, 
autonomy, and justice.311 Nonmaleficence generally requires that a physician’s 
intervention not harm the patient.312 While autonomy has often overshadowed 
the other core bioethics principles in recent discourse,313 nonmaleficence still 
offers valuable instruction in this context. In many instances of potential dual-
loyalty conflict, physicians could better justify actions taken for public health 
protection by ensuring such conduct, even if not maximizing patient welfare, at 
least does not further harm their individual patients or such harm is minimized 
as much as possible. This may not be practicable in all patient/public health 
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conflicts. When respecting nonmaleficence is feasible with concurrent public 
health protection, however, physicians’ public health duties should be 
interpreted to incorporate the principle. Physicians should be deemed to 
faithfully discharge their reinvigorated public health duties only if, in doing so, 
they also have managed harm avoidance/harm minimization with their 
individual patients. 
CONCLUSION 
Law generally obscures physicians’ public health duties with limited, ad 
hoc recognition and insufficient theorization for the source and strength of 
these duties. The strong patient-primacy directive often overrides physicians’ 
elusive public health obligations in ways that facilitate externalization of health 
risks from patients to the community. This problematic pattern, more salient as 
a result of COVID-19, threatens an already fragile public health system. 
Legal change alone will not be sufficient to ensure optimal physician 
engagement in public health protection. A variety of reforms, such as more 
education, training, and positive rewards, including, importantly, stronger 
financial incentives for physicians’ public health actions, are also needed. 
However, clearer legal recognition of physicians’ public health duties can also 
have extra-legal impact to the extent it helps shift professional norms about 
physician engagement in matters of public health. 
While amplification seems warranted, where law gives greater visibility to 
and puts more weight on physicians’ obligations to safeguard community health, 
such a legal shift raises difficult challenges, both practical and doctrinal, such as 
potential unbounded liability exposure and overcoming law’s general reluctance 
to impose affirmative duties outside special relationships. Various justifications 
support this shift, including social contract theory and equitable distribution of 
physician burden, although they may not fully address all concerns with 
recalibrating physicians’ duties. 
At bottom, the most compelling reason to amplify physicians’ public 
health duties is instrumental. Law needs to appropriate physicians for public 
health protection because, as a practical matter, there are no better choices. The 
nation’s public health system largely depends upon nongovernmental actors, 
and private physicians are at the center of this public/private response. 
Physicians occupy a unique strategic role embedded between the patient, other 
patients, and society and perform critical sentinel, gatekeeper, and learned 
intermediary functions that are indispensable to effective public health 
protection. Requiring physicians to pay greater heed to the population’s health, 
even to the occasional detriment of doing all possible for individual patients, 
has become an unavoidable imperative. 
